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IN
IN THE
THE EYE
EYE OF
OF THE
THE BEHOLDER
BEHOLDER
Victory and defeat
defeat in US military
military operations
operations
Victory
Dominic Johnson
Johnson and
Dominic
and Dominic
Dominic Tierney
Tierney

We got them
out, thank
thank God
them all out,
God.. It
lt went
went perfectly.
perfectly.
President Gerald
President
Gerald Ford,
Ford. following
following the 1975 Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident
Incident
(Wetterhahn
(Wetterhahn 2002:
2002: 20 I)

It would
quite remarkable
would require
require quite
remarkable ignorance
ignorance to consider
consider [the
[the
Somalia
Somalia operation]
operation) a UN success.
success.
(Lewis
(Lewis and Mayall 1996: 124)

Victory
eye of
beholder. Unless
outcome
Victory is in the
the eye
of the
the beholder.
Unless the
the battlefield
battlefield
outcome is decidecisive,
of
or defeat
tend to
heavily influenced
sive, evaluations
evaluations
of victory
victory or
defeat tend
to be
be heavily
influenced by
by psychopsychological and
informational biases.
These
produce "imagined
logical
and informational
biases.
These biases
biases often
often produce
"imagined
victories," in which
ground is nevertheless
perceived
as
victories,"
which the
the loser
loser on
on the
the ground
nevertheless
perceived
as
winning,
the
winning, or
or alternatively
alternatively
the winner
winner on
on the
the ground
ground is perceived
perceived as
as losing.
losing. We
We
illustrate
imagined victories
victories emerge
two extreme
illustrate how
how and
and why imagined
emerge by contrasting
contrasting
two
extreme
cases
this phenomenon:
phenomenon: the
Mayaguez Incident
Incident (a failure
perceived as
cases of
of this
the 1975
1975 Mayaguez
failure perceived
as
a success)
success) and
the 1992-1994
US intervention
intervention in Somalia
perceived
and the
1992-1994
US
Somalia (a success
success perceived
as a failure)
as
failure), .

Introduction
Introduction
On
defeat
On January
January 8, 1815,
1815, Colonel
Colonel Andrew
Andrew Jackson
Jackson exacted
exacted a devastating
devastating
defeat on
on
the British
British at the
two
the
the Battle
Battle of
of New
New Orleans.
Orleans. Jackson's
Jackson's army
army was
was outnumbered
outnumbered
t\VO
to one,
one, but
but enjoyed
prepared position,
position, and
to
enjoyed the
the advantages
advantages of
of a prepared
and his
his ranks
ranks were
were
swelled
an unlikely
collection of
Haitian slaves,
Kentucky
swelled by
by an
unlikely collection
of brothers
brothers in anns
arms: : Haitian
slaves, Kentucky
mountain
Lafitte and
daring shipmates.
mountain men,
men, and
and the
the legendary
legendary pirate
pirate Jean
Jean Lafitte
and his
his daring
shipmates.
The
battle helped
Americans that
The celebrated
celebrated battle
helped to establish
establish the
the perception
perception among
among Americans
that
they
won the
the War
309). This
This belief
US success
they had
had won
War of
of 1812
1812 (Hickey
(Hickey 1989:
1989: 309).
belief in us
success
emerged
the war
was a draw:
the United
emerged despite
despite the
the fact
fact that
that the
war overall
overall was
draw: the
United States
States failed
failed
Washington DC
to
in its
its objective
objective to annex
annex Canada,
Canada, the
the British
British razed
razed much
much of
of Washington
DC to
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the ground,
ground, and Americans
Americans were deeply
deeply divided
divided by the conflict.
conflict. Indeed,
Indeed,
unknown to the men fighting
unknown
fighting at the Battle
Battle of
of New
New Orleans,
Orleans, the two governments
governments
had already
peace terms
already agreed
agreed peace
terms in far-off
far-off Holland.
Holland.
One hundred
twenty-five years
years later, a similar
image was gaining
hundred and twenty-five
similar faulty image
gaining
momentum about
momentum
about events
events in France.
France. The emergency
emergency evacuation
evacuation of
of the Allied
Allied
Expeditionary
was transformed
transforn1ed into a kind of
Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk
Dunkirk in 1940 was
of
victory, in which
shipped to safety
safety on a motley
motley armada
victory,
which thousands
thousands of
of troops
troops were
were shipped
annada
of
German tanks
down on their
of vessels
vessels as German
tanks bore
bore down
their heels. For British
British observers,
observers, the
dramatic
success, refodramatic rescue
rescue produced
produced a seductive
seductive tendency
tendency to view
view events
events as a success,
cusing
wider picture:
military defeat
cusing attention
attention away
away from the wider
picture: disastrous
disastrous military
defeat for
Britain and France.
France. As Churchill
Churchill noted,
noted, "Wars
"Wars are not won by evacuations"
evacuations"
(Jenkins
(Jenkins 2002: 597).
In
world came
In 1962, when the world
came closest
closest to nuclear
nuclear war, the Cuban
Cuban Missile
Missile
Crisis was defused
defused by a US-Soviet
involved significant
significant compromises
compromises
Crisis
US-Soviet deal that involved
and concessions
missiles from
concessions on both sides: the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union withdrew
withdrew its missiles
Cuba
Cuba,, and the United
United States
States issued
issued a pledge
pledge not to invade
invade Cuba
Cuba and agreed
agreed to
withdraw
missiles from Turkey.
world, in capitalist
withdraw its own missiles
Turkey. Yet all over
over the world,
capitalist and
communist
communist states
states alike,
alike. this
this crisis
crisis was seen as an unalloyed
unalloyed victory
victory for the
United States.
major defeat
Moscow . The Soviet
Khrushchev
States. and a major
defeat for Moscow.
Soviet leader
leader Khrushchev
was soon thrown
2004 ).
thrown out of
of office
office (Johnson
(Johnson and Tierney
Tierney 2004).
Six years
years later, at the high point
point of
of the Vietnam
military
Vietnam War,
War, the US military
achieved
remarkable battlefield
throwing back
back a massive
achieved a remarkable
battlefield victory
victory in throwing
massive communist
communist
surprise
holiday. Yet the Tet
Tet Offensive
surprise attack
attack during
during the 1968 Tet holiday.
Offensive was perceived
perceived
in the United
United States
States as a major
major setback,
setback, and led directly
directly to US de-escalation
de-escalation of
of
the war (Gilbert
(Gilbert and Head 1996).
A similar
image surrounded
similar puzzling
puzzling image
surrounded the Yorn
Yom Kippur
Kippur War
War in 1973, when
when
Egypt and Syria
Syria launched
launched a two-front
two-front surprise
surprise attack
attack on Israel which,
which, after
after early
Arab successes,
successes, ultimately
ultimately led to a complete
complete reversal
reversal and a significant
significant Israeli
victory on the battlefield.
battlefield. Despite
victory
Despite this outcome,
outcome, in both Israel and the
the Arab
states the war was seen as a major
triumph for the Arabs
major disaster
disaster for Israel and a triumph
Arabs
((Rabinovich
Rabinovich 2004; Pollack
Pollack 2002).
2002).

The
The puzzle
puzzle of
of victory
victory
The examples
above illustrate
trend throughout
examples above
illustrate a recurrent
recurrent trend
throughout history,
history, in which
which perceptions
vanquished diverge
outcome.
ceptions of
of victor
victor and vanquished
diverge widely
widely from the battlefield
battlefield outcome.
Armies
brilliant triumphs
Armies can win brilliant
triumphs but can nevertheless
nevertheless be seen as losing.
losing. DiploDiplomats can return from crisis
crisis negotiations
negotiations clutching
clutching tangible
tangible gains
gains but find the
public
victory do not reflect
public sees the outcome
outcome as a failure. If perceptions
perceptions of
of victory
events
events on the ground,
ground, how can these perceptions
perceptions be explained?
explained?
In
In this chapter
chapter we provide
provide an explanation
explanation based
based on our
our book, Failing
Failing to Win:
Win:
Perceptions
Defeat in
International Politics
Perceptions of
of Victo,y
ViCt01~Vand
and Defeat
ill International
Politics (Johnson
(Johnson and
Tierney
judge war and crisis
Tierney 2006
2006).). People regularly
regularly judge
crisis outcomes
outcomes on the basis
basis of
of
psychological
psychological, , cultural,
cultural, and political
political factors
factors that are
arc largely
largely independent
independent of
of the
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battlefield,
preexisting beliefs
battlefield, such as preexisting
expectations. symbolic
symbolic events,
beliefs and expectations,
events, and
and
manipulation by
manipulation
by elites
elites and the media.
media .
Understanding
sources of
of bias is vital because
Understanding these
these sources
because perceptions
perceptions of
of victory
victory
have a powerful
powerful impact
can have
impact on current
current and future
future policy-making.
policy-making. For
For one
one thing.
thing.
perceptions
perceptions of
or break
political careers.
careers. President
of victory
victory can make or
break political
President Kennedy
Kennedy
enjoyed
political benefits
enjoyed great
great political
benefits from
from the Cuban
Cuban Missile
Missile Crisis;
Crisis; Khrushchev
Khrushchev quite
quite
the opposite.
opposite. After
declared he would
would not run again
again for president.
After Tet,
Tet, Johnson
Johnson declared
president.
Following
Following the Yorn
Yom Kippur
Kippur War, the Israe
Israelili government
government resigned.
resigned.
Perceptions
because the American
Perceptions of
of success
success are also important
important because
American public
public is
much less tolerant
casualties when it perceives
tolerant of
of US casualties
aforeign policy
perceives a.foreign
policy mission
mission is
failing . When
ssion is deemed
failing.
When a mi
mission
deemed to be going
going well, as in Panama
Panama or the
first
the first
Gulf
approval for the president
Gulf War,
War, approval
president can rise even
even as casualties
casualties mount.
mount. When
When
public thinks
thinks a war
war is going
the US public
badly, as in Vietnam
Vietnam after
after Tet
going badly,
Tet in I1968.
968.
further
further casualties
casualties have
have a much
much greater
negative effect
effect on presidential
presidential approval
greater negative
approval
ratings.
Feaver and Christopher
Christopher Gelpi
ratings. As Peter
Peter Feaver
Gelpi (2004)
(2004) conclude,
conclude, "The
"The public
public is
defeat
phobic, not casualty
casualty phobic."!
phobic." 1 A rising
rising sense
of failure
defeat phobic,
sense of
failure can increase
increase
public
withdraw, as is evident
public and congressional
congressional pressure
pressure to withdraw,
evident today
Iraq..
today with Iraq
Indeed, it was Feaver
Feaver himself
Indeed,
himself who
who advised
advised the Bush administration
administration to counter
counter
this
trend in opinion
opinion with a clear
this trend
clear "strategy
"strategy for victory"
(New York Times.
victory" (New
Times.
December
December 4, 2005).
2005).
Perceptions of
Perceptions
of victory
shape the historical
historical lessons
lessons that
that are drawn
victory also shape
drawn from
from
events. An event
event perceived
perceived as a success
becomes a model
events.
success becomes
model for future
future policypolicymaking, while
while strategies
associated with a perceived
making,
strategies associated
perceived failure
failure become
become taboo.
taboo. For
For
example,
Americans emerged
emerged from the Cuban
example, Americans
Cuban Missile
Missile Cri
Crisis
sis flush with the
the
feeling
feeling of
of victory,
victory, having
having "learned"
"learned" that a tough
tough stand
stand would
would always
always make
make the
the
Soviets
retreat. Thi
Soviets retreat.
Thiss view was misplaced,
misplaced, because
because the crisis
crisis had
had actually
actually ended
ended
with a compromise
compromise deal. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, subsequent
subsequent administrations
administrations believed
believed that
that
the United
United States
States could
could employ
employ the same tactics
tactics of
of steadily
steadily escalating
escalating force that
that
were believed
believed to have produced
produced victory
were
victory in the missile
missile crisis
crisis to win again
thiss
again - thi
time in Vi
etnam. Richard
Richard Lebow
Lebow (1990:
argues that "Kennedy's
time
Vietnam.
(1990: 488)
488) argues
"Kennedy's successful
successful
use of
of coercive
coercive diplomacy
diplomacy [in the Cuban
Cuban Missile
Missile Crisis]
Crisis] led ineluctably
ineluctably to AmerAmerintervention in Vietnam."
Vietnam."
ican intervention
Perceptions
of victory
victory clearly
have dramatic
dramatic consequences.
Perceptions of
clearly have
consequences. The
The challenge
challenge is
understand how they are forrned,
they can
to understand
formed, so they
can be anticipated
anticipated or altered.
altered. In this
thi s
chapter,
out two frameworks
explaining perceptions
perceptions of
chapter, we set out
frameworks for explaining
of victory:
victory : (I)
(I)
"Score-keeping,"
judge victory
"Score-keeping," whereby
whereby observers
observers judge
victory on the basis
basis of
of material
material gains
gains
and
Match-fixing," whereby
and losses,
losses, and (2) ""Match-fixing,"
whereby observers
victory on the basis
observers judge
judge victory
basis
of
psychological and informational
of psychological
informational biases
biases that "fix"
"fix" their
their interpretation
interpretation of
of
events.
events. We are interested
interested in the perceptions
of "observers";
"observers"; that
perceptions of
that is, how
how outoutsiders
(such as the public
public and the media)
siders (such
media) who are not involved
involved in the
the decisiondecisionmaking process
judge victory
victory and defeat
making
process judge
defeat in international
international disputes.
disputes,
We illustrate
illustrate our model by comparing
comparing perceptions
perceptions of
of success
success in two
two US milimilitary operations:
Mayaguez Incident
Incident and the 1992-1994
tary
operations: the 1975 Mayaguez
1992-1994 intervention
interventi o n in
Somalia.
Somalia. The
The missions
missions have
have much
much in common.
common, Both
Both were limited
limited deployments
deployments
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of US air, ground,
ground, and naval forces in a situation
situation short of
of war; both were
under
of
were under
the direction
presidents new to office;
number of
of casualties
casualties was
direction of
of US presidents
office; the number
similar, with
with 41
41 Americans
Americans killed
South-East Asia and 43 killed
killed in South-East
killed in Somalia;
Somalia;
similar,
and both
firefights of
unexpected ferocity
of Koh
botb cases
cases included
included firefights
of unexpected
ferocity (on the island
island of
Tang and in downtown
downtown Mogadishu)
Mogadishu) in which
which similar
similar numbers
numbers of
of Americans
Americans
Tang
died
15 and 18,
of perceptions
perceptions
died ((15
18, respectively).
respectively). Despite
Despite these
tbese similarities,
similarities, in terms
terms of
of victory,
victory, they were mirror
mirror images:
images: Mayaguez
Mayaguez was a failure
failure perceived
of
perceived as a
success;
success; Somalia
Somalia was a success
success perceived
perceived as a failure.
failure.

Mayaguez and
and Somalia:
Somalia: an outline
outline of
of events
events
Mayaguez
On May 12,
merchant ship
ship
12, 1975, Cambodian
Cambodian Khmer
Khmer Rouge forces
forces seized
seized the US merchant
Gulf of
of Siam.
Mayaguez
Mayaguez and its 39 American
American crew
crew in international
international waters
waters in the Gulf
US President
President Gerald
Marine task force to the Cambodian
Gerald Ford ordered
ordered a Marine
Cambodian island
island
of
where the Mayaguez
Mayaguez was anchored
rescue the ship and
and crew
of Koh Tang,
Tang, where
anchored, , to rescue
crew
supposedly few captors.
captors. In fact, the entire
crew had been
been transferred
entire crew
transferred to
from the supposedly
troops, well
the mainland
mainland, , and Koh Tang
Tang was defended
defended by elite
elite Khmer
Khmer naval troops,
armed
positions, who ferociously
Marines.
armed and dug into defensive
defensive positions,
ferociously engaged
engaged the Marines.
US naval aircraft
mainland.
aircraft also
also carried
carried out air strikes
strikes against
against the Cambodian
Cambodian mainland.
Thai fishing
As these attacks
Mayaguez crew
attacks proceeded,
proceeded, the Mayaguez
crew was released
released in a Thai
last
the Mayaguez
Incident The Last
boat. Ralph Wetterhahn
Wetterhahn called
called his book
book on the
Mayaguez Incident
Battle:
Barrie: "[T]he
"[Tjhe fourteen
fourteen hours
hours of
of combat
combat on May
May 15, 1975, constituted
constituted the last
names became
official
official American
American battle
battle of
of the Vietnam
Vietnam conflict.
conflict. The casualty
casualty names
became the
Washington,
final ones inscribed
inscribed on the Vietnam
Vietnam Veterans
Veterans Memorial
Memorial Wall in Washington,
D.C." (2002:
(2002: 5).
of his last acts
In November
November 1992, President
President George
George H.W. Bush decided
decided as one of
in office to send US military
military forces to kick-start
kick-start the delivery
delivery of
of humanitarian
humanitarian aid to
Somalia,
impoverished state racked
racked by
war and starvation.
were two
two
Somalia, an impoverished
by civil war
starvation. There
There were
main stages to the US military
humanitarmilitary intervention
intervention in Somalia.
Somalia. Stage 1I was a humanitarian mission,
(UNIT AF).
mission, with US forces leading a multinational
multinational United Task
Task Force (UNITAF).
The American
Stage 2 was a
American component
component was designated
designated Operation
Operation Restore Hope. Stage
mission in which the United
played a smaller
broader UN "nation-building"
broader
"nation-building" mission
United States
States played
smaller
efforts to
but still significant
significant role (UNOSOM
(UNOSOM II). This second
second stage included
included efforts
capture
General Mohamed
the infacapture the Somali warlord
warlord General
Mohamed Farah Aidid,
Aidid, leading
leading to the
Down. In the
mous
mous battle in Mogadishu
Mogadishu popularized
popularized in the movie
movie Black Hawk
Hawk Down.
battle, on October
Clinton announced
decisive change
change
wake of
of this battle,
October 7, President
President Clinton
announced a decisive
in policy,
policy, which distanced
distanced the United States from nation-building
nation-building efforts
efforts in
Somalia,
ultimately led to the withSomalia, gave up the attempt
attempt to capture
capture Aidid,
Aidid, and ultimately
drawal of
of all US personnel
personnel from the country
country by March
March 1994.

Perceptions
Perceptions of success
success
Most Americans
Americans saw the Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident
one poll, 79
Incident as a striking
striking victory.
victory. In one
public rated Ford's
handling of
of the episode
episode as "excellent"
"excellent" or
percent of
percent
of the public
Ford's handling
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"good,"
"good," and
and only
only 18 percent
percent saw
saw it as
as being
"only fair"
fair" or
or "poor"
"poor" (polls
(polls from
from
being "only
www.lexisnexis.com
www.lexisnexis.com
unless
stated otherwise;
otherwise; Harris Survey
Survey Poll,
Poll, May 23-27.
23-27.
unless stated
1975).
By August
August 1975,
46 percent
percent of
1975). By
1975, 46
of Americans
were positive
about Ford"s
Ford's
Americans were
positive about
handling of
of the Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident
Incident and 30
handling
30 percent
percent were
were negative
(Harris Survey
Survey
negative (Harris
poll, August
I 975). A small
percent thought
poll,
August 5-9,
5-9,1975).
small minority
minority of
of 12 percent
that Ford
Ford "over"overthought that
American prestige" following
reacted" to the crisis "to
"to re-establish American
following the end of
of
Vietnam War, but 81 percent
percent believed
believed that this
this was
was an unfair
the Vietnam
unfair criticism
criticism (Time
(Time
poll , May
with the
poll,
May 14-22,
14-22, 1975).
1975). Even
Even with
horrors of
Vietnam fresh
fresh in their
their minds.
minds.
the horrors
of Vietnam
fully
of Americans
fully 69 percent
percent of
Americans disagreed
disagreed that the United
United States
States should
should have
have
waited longer
longer to use force for fear of
waited
of getting
getting "bogged
"bogged down
down in another
another war in
Southeast
Asia" (Harris
(Harris Survey
May 23-27,
Southeast Asia"
Survey Poll
Poll, , May
23-27, 1975).
1975). Ford's
Ford's approval
rating
approval rating
been around
40 percent
had been
around 40
percent in the first four months
of 1975,
1975, but following
following the
months of
Mayaguez Incident
jumped to
Mayaguez
Incident it jumped
and did
did not
fall back
preto 51 percent,
percent, and
not fall
back to preMayaguez levels
until December
Mayaguez
levels until
December 1975
1975 (Gallup
polls,s, various,
various, 1975).
1975).
(Gallup poll
According to John
John Greene
I 995: 151
According
Greene ((1995:
151),), "All
"All told,
told, it was
was the
the biggest
biggest political
political
victory
of
presidency." "Throughout
victory of the Ford presidency."
"Throughout the free world,"
world," Wetterhahn
Wetterhahn
wrote, "headlines
touted Ford's
Ford's victory
wrote,
"headlines touted
victory .. . In spite
spite of
of a host
host of
inaccuracies,
of inaccuracies.
nearly every
every news
news outlet
reported Ford's
nearly
outlet reported
action as a diplomatic
diplomatic and political
Ford's action
politi cal
triumph"
few liberal
liberal congressmen
triumph" (2002:
(2002: 256).
256)2 2 A few
congressmen in 1975
1975 called
called for
for an investigainvestigation into
into Ford's
of force,
tion
Ford's use
use of
force, but overall
overall Congress
Congress was
was very
very supportive
supportive of
of Ford's
Ford's
actions.
The Wall Street
Journal reported
actions. The
Street Journal
on May
16, I1975
Ford "basked
"basked in
repo11ed on
May 16,
975 that
that Ford
bipartisan political
political praise.":"!Ford
praise." 3 Ford received
bipartisan
standing ovation
students at the
received a standing
ovation by students
University of
of Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania - previously
University
previously famous
anti- Vietnam War demondemonfamous for its anti-Vietnam
strations (Menetrey-Monchau
(Menetrey-Monchau 2005:
strations
2005: 347-348;
347-348: Time, May
May 26,
26,1975:
20).
1975: 20).
his memoirs,
In his
memoirs, Ford remarked
remarked that after
after Mayaguez,
of a sudden,
sudden, the
Mayaguez, "All
"All of
gloomy
mood began
began to
to fade"
gloomy national
national mood
fade" ((1979:
284). One
One of
of the
the few
critics of
of the
the
I 979: 284).
few critics
episode was
was The Nation,
Nation, which
episode
which ~- interestingly
argument -~ was
primarily
interestingly for our
our argument
was primarily
concerned
by the widespread
widespread perception
perception of
concerned by
victory: "the most
troublesome
of victory:
most troublesome
aspect" of
of Mayaguez,
wrote, was
aspect"
Mayagucz, an editorial
editorial wrote,
was "the jubilant,
backslapping
jubilant, backslapping
response" of
Congress and
public opinion
response"
of Congress
and public
opinion (May
(May 31,
31, 1975:
1975: 642).
642). A
subsequent
A subsequent
public congressional
congressional investigation
host of
public
investigation pointed
pointed to a host
deficiencies in the operaoperaof deficiencies
tion,
but, all in all,
all, the dominant
image of
of victory
victory could
tion, but,
dominant image
could not be
be shaken.
shaken. Far from
from
regretting the
the Mayaguez
regretting
Mayagucz episode,
episode, Ford repeatedly
repeatedly highlighted
highlighted it when
when running
running
for reelection
reelection in 1976
for
1976 (Guilmartin
(Guilrnartin 1995).
1995). "As
"As recently
as the
2000 Republican
Republican
recently as
the 2000
Convention,
Convention, the Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident
Incident was
was cited
cited as a triumph
triumph for President
President Ford
and
the country"
country" (Wetterhahn
and the
(Wetterhahn 2002:
2002: 312).
312).
In stark contrast.
contrast, the
the US
US intervention
intervention in Somalia
1992-1994
usuallyy
Somalia 19921994 is usuall
summarized
in one
one word:
word: "failure."
"failure." Media
summarized
Media analyst
analyst Robert
Entman (2004:
(2004: 20)
201
Robert Entman
found that the
the intervention
prominently and resonantly
found
intervention was
was "framed
"framed prominently
disasresonantly as a disastrous failure."
Polls indicated
indicated that over
over 70
trous
failure." Polls
70 percent
percent of
of the public
public supported
supported the
Somalia
intervention
into
the
spring
of
1993
(Americans
Somalia intervention
spring of 1993 (Americans Talk
Talk Issues
Foundation
Issues Foundation
and the
Alton Jones
Foundation poll,
March 23-April
and
the W.
W. Alton
Jones Foundation
poll, March
23-April 4,
1993). However.
However.
4, 1993).
this support
this
support began
began to wane
wane as soon
soon as UNIT
UNITAF
handed over
over to the more
more
AF handed
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ambitious UNOSOM
UNOSOM IIII mission
mission in May 1993. By September,
September, approval
approval for US
ambitious
policy in Somalia
policy
Somalia had fallen to 41
41 percent
percent (Eichenberg
(Eichenberg 2004: 66; CBS New/New
New/New
York Times poll, June
June 21
21-24,1993;
Times Mirror
Mirror poll, September
September 9-15,
9-15,1993).
York
- 24, 1993; Times
1993).
The Black
battle in Mogadishu
Black Hawk
Hawk Down battle
Mogadishu on October
October 3 led to a firestorm
firestorm of
of
criticism
criticism of
of the
the Somalia
Somalia mission
mission and
and a further
further fall in public
public approval
approval of
of the
the
mission
mission to around
around 30 percent
percent (Foyle
(Foyle 1999: 220; CBS News
News poll, October
October 6,
I1993:
993; NBC News
News poll, October
October 6, 1993). Two
Two days after
after the Mogadishu
Mogadishu battle
on October
October 5, only
only 25 percent
percent of
of Americans
Americans thought
thought the intervention
intervention "to provide
provide
humanitarian relief'
relief' was successful,
humanitarian
successful, and 66 percent
percent thought
thought it was unsuccessful
unsuccessful
Today
1993). 4
(Gallup/CNN/USA
(Gallup/CNNIUSA
Today poll
poll,, October
October 5,
5,1993).'
Why
Why did
did people
people decide
decide that Mayaguez
Mayaguez was a success
success and Somalia
Somalia was a
failure?
failure'?

Framework 1:
Framework
1: Score-keeping
Score-keeping
The simplest
simplest explanation
explanation for perceptions
perceptions of victory
victory and defeat
defeat is that they just
just
reflect whatever
whatever happened
happened on the ground.
ground. The hypothesis
hypothesis here is that people
people are
"score-keeping" the result
result:: observers
determine the winners
winners and losers
losers on the
"score-keeping"
observers determine
material gains
basis of
of the material
gains and losses
losses represented
represented in a "scorecard."
"scorecard." PsychologiPsychological gains such as establishing
establishing "resolve"
"resolve" or "credibility"
"credibility" are not recorded
recorded in a
score-keeping
score-keeping analysis,
analysis, because
because such factors are merely
merely a means
means to a material
material
end and not an end
end in themselves
themselves (just
(just as a football
football team is judged
judged on points
points
scored, rather
rather than on the resolve
produced these points).
points).
scored,
resolve that may have produced
We can test
whether people
rest whether
people are score-keeping
score-keeping or not by comparing
comparing the congruence
gruence between
between the scorecard
scorecard and perceptions.
perceptions. If they match,
match, then this suggests
suggests
(although
(although it does
docs not prove)
prove) that perceptions
perceptions are
arc simply
simply the product
product of
of scorescorekeeping.
To determine
keeping. To
determine what the scorecard
scorecard is, we have to consider
consider two elements:
elements:

2

Gains and
and losses
losses (of
(of material
material elements
elements such as territory,
territory, prisoners,
prisoners, equipequipment, and casualties).
casualties).
Aims ((were
were specific
Aims
specific material
material goals
goals achieved
achieved or not?)
not?)..

Any reasonable
Any
reasonable analysis
analysis of
of gains and aims must take
take account
account of two further
further
qualifications:
qualifications:

2

The importance
importance of
of gains
gains and aims
aims (greater
(greater importance
importance of
of a gain or aim produces extra
extra credit
credit for successfully
successfully achieving
achieving it, relative
relative to other
other gains
gains and
aims).
gains and aims (greater
The difficulty
difficulty of
of gains
(greater difficulty
difficulty of
of a gain or aim - in
terms
terms of
of likely
likely costs
costs incurred
incurred in its attainment
attainment - produces
produces extra credit
credit for
successfully
successfully achieving
achieving it, relative
relative to other
other gains
gains and aims)
aims).'.5

Score-keeping
Score-keeping is not a straw man theory
theory of
of perceptions
perceptions of
of victory,
victory, deliberately
deliberately
created
created to fail in favor
favor of
of some other
other theory.
theory. First, in many cases,
cases, such as World
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War
War II, score-keeping
score-keeping is a good
good theory
theory of
of perceptions
perceptions of
of victory
victory and defeat
defeat everyone agrees
victors in 1945, and for the same
same reasons,
reasons, based
based on the
everyone
agrees on the victors
material
partially conmaterial outcome
outcome of
of the war. Second,
Second, score-keeping
score-keeping sometimes
sometimes partially
contributes to perceptions
perceptions of
tributes
of victory
victory even
even if other
other psychological
psychological factors
factors are also at
work. Third,
Third, we argue
argue that score-keeping
score-keeping is how people
people should
should judge
judge victory
victory
and defeat,
defeat, because
because it involves
involves a careful
careful and reasoned
reasoned assessment
assessment of
of the achieveachievement
ment of
of gains
gains and aims (although,
(although, as Beckett
Beckett and Angstrom
Angstrom point
point out in ChapChapters 4 and
and 5 of
ters
of this volume
volume too, aims
aims and criteria
criteria are sometimes
sometimes difficult
difficult to judge
judge
success
success from),
from), qualified
qualified by importance
importance and difficulty.
difficulty.

Were observers
Incident?
observers score-keeping
score-keeping the
the Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident?
were the US material
gains and losses
losses in the Mayaguez
Mayaguez lncident?
Incident?"6 As
What were
material gains
Table
Table 3.1 indicates,
indicates, for the United
United States
States the Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident
Incident was marked
marked by
a series
series of
of costly
costly and in many cases
cases avoidable
avoidable errors.
errors. Chief
Chief among
among them were
mistaken belief
hostages were on the island
island of
of Koh Tang;
Tang; the misbelief that the hostages
the mistaken
belief that
taken
taken belief
that Koh Tang
Tang was defended
defended by lightly
lightly armed
armed troops
troops when it was in
fact garrisoned
ganisoned by a large force of
of elite Khmer
Khmer Rouge soldiers;
soldiers; and leaving
leaving
behind three
three US Marines
Marines on Koh Tang,
Tang, who were later captured
captured and executed.
executed.' 7
behind
It was a rushed
operation: in Richard
rushed operation:
Richard Gabriel's
Gabriel's words, "the
"the political
political pressure
pressure to
do something
something immediately
immediately had overridden
overridden military
military common
common sense"
sense" (1985:
(1985: 68).
There
were no maps
There were
maps available
available of
of the island,
island, for example.
example. Planning
Planning was also
also
based
based on the assumption
assumption that no helicopters
helicopters would
would be lost to enemy
enemy fire or
mechanical breakdown
breakdown (ibid.:
(ibid.: 70).
mechanical
large part
part as a result
In large
result of these
these errors,
errors, a mission
mission that
that was
was meant
meant to be a
rapid rescue
rapid
rescue operation
operation quickly
quickly turned
turned into a bitter
bitter fight
fight on Koh Tang,
Tang, as US
200 heavily
Marines
Marines faced
faced 150150~200
heavily armed
armed Khmer
Khmer Rouge
Rouge soldiers.
soldiers. When
When the
Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident
Incident was over,
over, 41 US servicemen
servicemen had been
been killed;
killed; 50 were
were
wounded;
Marine position
wounded; and the Marine
position on Koh Tang
Tang had been
been very
very nearly
nearly overrun
overrun
(Gabriel
(Gabriel 1985: 82). Seven of
of the eight
eight helicopters
helicopters used in the attack
attack on the
island
were shot down
island were
down or damaged.
damaged. Overall,
Overall, this was a bungled
bungled operation
operation
based
based on poor
poor intelligence,
intelligence, in which
which more Marines
Marines died than there
there were
were
hostages
rescued.
hostages to be rescued.
Furthermore. the attack on
Furthermore,
011 Koh Tang had no effect
effect on the Cambodian
Cambodian
decision
decision to release
release the American
American hostages.
hostages. The ship had been
been seized
seized by local
Khmer
Khmer forces,
forces. and as soon as the communist
communist leadership
leadership found
found out, they sumsummoned the local commanding
moned
commanding officer
officer to Phnom Penh. Party member
member Ieng
leng Sary
recalls
recalls that the leadership
leadership sent him back
back "with
"with the order
order to release
release the Mayaguez
Mayogues:
ship immediately"
immediately" (Becker
(Becker 1986: 196). At 06:07
06:07 local time a statement
statement was
issued
issued by the Cambodians
Cambodians on US-monitored
US-monitored Phnom Penh radio
radio stating
stating that the
ship would
would be released,
released, although
although the crew was not explicitly
explicitly mentioned
mentioned (Menc(Menc345). The Mayaguez
trey-Monchau
trey-Monchau 2005: 345).
Mayaguez crew was then
then set free around
around
06:30-07:00.
06:30-07:00. The Marine
Marine attack
attack on Koh Tang
Tang began
began at 06:20
06:20 (far from where
where
Mayaguez
the crew were
were being
being released).
released). US Marines
Marines did not board
board the empty
empty Mcvaguei
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Tahle 3. 1 US scorecard from the Mayagucz Incident

.:;

Event

·13~~

Type of'
OU/CO/lie

A US ai111
achieved:>

Altering the credit due

For
leader

For
observer
High

Positive
outcomes

Crew released

Gain

Aim achieved

Very high

Negative
outcomes

41 Americans
killed, 50
wounded
Diplomatic crisis
with Thailand

Loss

Aim not
achieved

High

Loss

Aim not
achieved

Improvement of
Vietnam's
position

Loss

Aim not
achieved

Very low"

Very high

High (chance of
avoiding)

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate/High
(chance of
avoiding)
Moderate
(chance of
avoiding)

c

>"

Nole
a Occurred indcpcndcnlly of US auack.

Difficulty

Importance

~

Gain
or
loss~
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until 07:25,
07:25, and air strikes
strikes against
against the mainland
mainland did not begin
begin until 07:45 (Wet(Wetterhahn
"It
terhahn 2002:
2002: 338-339;
338-339; Menetrey-Monchau
Menetrey-Monchau 2005: 340). As Gabriel
Gabriel stressed,
stressed, "It
is important
the crew
of the Mayaguez
Mayaguez was
rescued by
important to emphasize
emphasize that the
crew of
was not
not rescued
by
military action.
action. They
They were
were released
released by the Cambodians
before the
Cambodians before
U.S. military
Mayaguez had come
1985: 72). If the
Mayaguez
come under
under combat
combat assault
assault by the Marines"
Marines" ((1985:
just
one
more
hour,
there
would
have
United
States
had
waited
United States
waited just one more hour, there would have been
been no need
need to
send
the Marines.
Marines.
send in the
Setbacks
Setbacks also accrued
accrued elsewhere.
elsewhere. The United
United States'
States' use of
of bases
bases in Thailand
Thailand
for the rescue
mission
led
to
a
diplomatic
crisis
between
Bangkok
and
Washingrescue mission led
diplomatic crisis between Bangkok
Washington,
ton, because
because the Thai
Thai government
government had explicitly
explicitly forbidden
forbidden this
this action.
action. Man
Manyy
Thais subsequently
violation of
Thais
subsequently claimed
claimed a violation
of their
their sovereignty,
sovereignty, and sought
sought a withwithof
US
forces
from
their
country.
Privately,
the
Thai
government,
and
drawal
drawal of US forces
their country. Privately, the Thai government, and cercertainly
the
Thai
military,
strong show
tainly the
military, may
may have
have supported
supported a strong
show of
of force
force against
against
communism
Indochina (Menetrey-Monchau
communism in Indochina
(Menetrey-Monchau 2005
2005:: 349-350;
349-350; Ford 1979: 277:
Kissinger
1999:
574).
But
there
were
nevertheless
negative
and
Kissinger 1999: 574).
there were nevertheless negative consequences,
consequences,
and
Washington
eventually
gave
up
an
electronic
listening
post
in
the
north
ooff
Washington
eventually gave
electronic listening post
the
Thailand.
Thailand.
Finally, by attacking
Cambodia's limited
limited air and naval power,
power, the United
United
Finally,
attacking Cambodia's
States ironically
ironically improved
improved the
the regional
regional position
position of
of Cambodia's
Cambodia's rival - Vietnam.
Vietnam.
States
Hanoi
was able
Mayaguez Incident
Hanoi was
able to take
take advantage
advantage of
of the Mayaguez
Incident by capturing
capturing the
the
contested
contested island
island of
of Puolo Wai
Wai,, with untapped
untapped oil fields in the area
area (Butler
(Butler 1985
1985::
441; Becker
Becker 1986: 198). "Despite
wrote Elizabeth
Elizabeth Becker,
441;
"Despite their
their boasts,"
boasts," wrote
Becker, ""itit was
was
Americans who
who were
were the
victors in the
Mayaguez face-off,
face-off, but the
Vietnot the Americans
the victors
the Mayaguez
the Vietnamese" (1986:
(1986: 198).
namese"
Gains
perceptions of
Gains and
and losses
losses cannot
cannot account
account for the dominant
dominant perceptions
of victory
victory. . But
But
perhaps
these perceptions
by the achievement
perhaps these
perceptions can
can be
be explained
explained by
achievement of
of US
US aims?
aims?
Ford's publicly
publicly stated
rescue of
of the
ship and
and crew.
crew. This
Ford's
stated objective
objective was
was the rescue
the ship
This was
was
indeed achieved
achieved - but not as a result
result of
of the US attack.
Ford had told
told congrescongresindeed
attack. Ford
sional
not going
sional leaders
leaders that "I
"I am not
going to risk the life
life of
of one
one marine
marine ...
... I'd never
never
forgive myself,"
forgive
myself," by which metric
metric the deaths
deaths of
of 41
41 soldiers
soldiers can only be called
called a
failure
(Wetterhahn 2002: 152).
failure (Wetterhahn
Task
Johnson wrote
wrote that his
his orders
Task Group
Group commander
commander Colonel
Colonel J.M. Johnson
orders were
were

to seize,
hold the island
seize, occupy,
occupy, and defend
defend the island
island of
of Koh Tang,
Tang, hold
island
indefinitely
indefinitely [for
[for a minimum
minimum of
of 48
48 hours]
hours] and to rescue
rescue any
any of
of the crew
crew
members
the island
members of
of the Mayaguez
Mayaguez found
found on the
island and to simultaneously
simultaneously
seize
the Mayaguez
Mayaguez and remove
remove the ship
current location.
seize the
ship from its current
location.
(quoted
(quoted in Gabriel
Gabriel 1985:
]985: 67)
The ship itself
itself was successfully
successfully recovered
recovered (though
(though it had been abandoned,
abandoned. so the
were achieved.
boarding was
unopposed). None
None of
boarding
was unopposed).
of the other
other goals
goals were
achieved. As
As Lamb
Lamb
((1984:
1984: 682)
of the crisis,
In retrospect,
of the
682) summed
summed up his
his study
study of
crisis, ""In
retrospect, the rescue
rescue of
the
Mayaguez
action
Mayaguez was
was a hasty,
hasty, risky,
risky, ill-conceived
ill-conceived
action not commensurate
commensurate with
with pubpublicly
licly stated
stated objectives."
objectives."
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The US response
response to the Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident
Incident can only be described
described as a costly
costly
failure. Since the hostages
hostages were about
about to be released
released in any case, the main
effects
effects of
of the US use of
of force were the deaths
deaths of
of 41
41 Americans
Americans (three
(three of
of them
executed),
executed), dozens
dozens of
of injuries,
injuries, loss or damage
damage to seven helicopters,
helicopters, a diplomatic
diplomatic
crisis with Thailand,
Thailand, and an improved
improved regional
regional position
position for Hanoi. This material
material
scorecard
widespread perception
scorecard clashes
clashes with the widespread
perception of
of US triumph.
triumph. Americans,
Americans, it
seems,
seems, were not score-keeping
score-keeping the outcome.
outcome.
1ers score-keepi11g
Were obser1
observers
score-keeping the
the Somulia
Somalia i11tervention?
intervention?

intervention in Somalia.
Somalia. Americans
Americans did not
The opposite
opposite story holds
holds for the US intervention
score-keep
score-keep this outcome
outcome either,
either, but here, observers
observers perceived
perceived a successful
successful
outcome
outcome as a failure.
failure. Before
Before considering
considering the gains
gains and losses
losses of
of the US intervention
vention in Somalia
Somalia (summarized
(summarized in Table
Table 3.2),
3.2), one must appreciate
appreciate the enormenormous difficulties
difficulties presented
presented by the Somali
Somali environment.
environment. The United
United States
States and the
United Nations
could not have chosen
Nations could
chosen a country
country less suitable
suitable for creating
creating stable
stable
political and economic
structures. The social fabric had unraveled
economic structures.
unraveled over
over the years
years
to such an extent
extent that
that complete
complete stability
stability was an impossible
impossible goal, while moderate
moderate
improvements in security,
security, together
together with the alleviation
alleviation of
of suffering,
suffering, were the
improvements
only realistic
realistic objectives.
objectives.
The first stage in the US military
AF) produced
military intervention
intervention (UNIT
(UNITAF)
produced several
several
substantial
AF operation
substantia] gains.
gains. By the time the United States
States ended
ended the UNIT
UNITAF
operation
and handed
handed over to the United Nations
Nations in May 1993, a disastrous
disastrous humanitarian
humanitarian
catastrophe had been
been alleviated.
al1eviated. Key areas for the relief
relief effort
effort had been secured,
secured,
catastrophe
and humanitarian
relief organizations
humanitarian relief
organizations were able to distribute
distribute aid far more
more effecteffectively than before.
before. Estimates
Estimates of
of the number
number of
of Somalis
Somalis whose
whose lives were saved
saved
from violence
violence or famine
famine in southern
southern Somalia
Somalia range
range from the tens of
of thousands
thousands to
a figure of
million and up (Weiss
190; see
of one million
(Weiss 2005: 66-67;
66-67; DiPrizio
DiPrizio 2002: 47,
47,190;
During this same
same period,
period, December
December 1992 to May
also De Waal 1994: 152). During
1993,
]993, the United
United States
States suffered
suffered only around
around a dozen
dozen casualties,
casualties, mostly
mostly accidenaccidental (Baynham
(Baynham] 1994).
994). In other
other words, for every
every US soldier
soldier deployed,
deployed, the lives of
of
between one and 40 Somalis
Somalis may have been saved;
saved; for every
every US soldier
soldier killed,
between
thousands
thousands of
of Somalis
Somalis were saved.
The number
number of
of refugees
refugees and internally
internally displaced
displaced persons
persons halved
halved from 1.5
1.5
million to around
million
around 750,000
750,000 from 1992 to 1994 (Weiss
(Weiss 2005: 69). Somali
Somali infrastructure
structure was also constructed
constructed or repaired,
repaired, including
including roads,
roads, schools,
schools, bridges,
bridges, and
sanitation,
sanitation, and some
some 3,500
3,500 police
police were trained
trained - tasks
tasks that went beyond
beyond the original UN mandate
mandate (Woods
(Woods 1997: 159; DiPrizio
DiPrizio 2002: 47; Weiss
Weiss 2005: 66).
UNITAF
enforced a local ceasefire
ceasefire and responded
responded forcefully
forcefully to attacks
attacks (Durch
(Durch
UNIT
AF enforced
1996:
1')96: 325). The UNITAF
UNITAF operation
operation cost the United
United States
States about $700
$700 million
million
(Clarke and Herbst 1997: 220). John Mueller
Mueller (2004
(2004:: 127)
]27) wrote,
wrote, "Never
"Never before,
before,
(Clarke
perhaps,
much been done for so many
perhaps, has so much
many at such little cost."
cost."
The UNOSOM
II mission
mission produced
UNOSOM II
produced a rather
rather more mixed
mixed picture
picture of
of gains
gains and
losses. As US and UN forces expanded
expanded their
their mission
mission to stabilize
stabilize Somalia
Somalia's' s
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political
Herculean proportions,
proportions, they
political chaos
chaos in 1993, a labor
labor of
of Herculean
they unsurprisingly
unsurprisingly
encountered increasing
increasing obstacles
obstacles and dangers.
dangers. Furthennore,
Furthermore, the
the UN
UN suffered
suffered
encountered
of
as well
from
overstretching
from incompetence,
incompetence,
overstretching
of resources,
resources, poor
poor diplomacy,
diplomacy,
well as
weaknesses
weaknesses in command
command and control
control (Weiss
(Weiss 2005;
2005; Laitin
Laitin 1999;
1999; Roberts
Roberts 1996
1996).).
Yet at the same
same time,
time, continuing
continuing the work
of UNITAF,
UNITAF, there
there were
were additional
additional
Yet
work of
improvements
improvements to Somali
Somali infrastructure
infrastructure (Harper
(Harper 1994; Ganzglass
Ganzglass 1997: 33).
Attempts
improve the material
Attempts to improve
material situation
situation on the
the ground
ground were
were soon
soon overshadovershadowed,
however, by the decision
hunting down
down one
owed, however,
decision to concentrate
concentrate efforts
efforts on
on hunting
one
particular warlord:
warlord: Mohamed
Mohamed Farah
Farah Aid
Aidid.
particular
id.
A US
this missi
on had conducted
US task force
force assigned
assigned to this
mission
conducted six
six raids into
into
Mogadishu between
August and September
September 1993. "All
"All of
of these,"
these," wrote
wrote
Mogadishu
between late August
Peter Huchthausen,
Huchthausen, "were
"were tactical
tactical successes
successes in which
which some
some of
of Aidid's
close
Aidid 's cl
o se
Peter
associates
associates were
were seized.
seized. Although
Although Aidid
Aidid was
was not caught,
caught, his
his movements
movements were
were
severely restricted"
restricted" (2003:
(2003: 178). The
The hunt for Aidid
culminated, however,
however, in the
the
Aidid culminated,
severely
Black Hawk
Hawk Down
Down battle
battle in Mogadishu
infamous
infamous Black
Mogadishu in October
October 1993,
J 993, which
which
unmitigated disasattracted enormous
attention and is widely
remembered as an unmitigated
attracted
enormous attention
widely remembered
disasCompromised by the downing
downing of
of two
soldiers
two Black Hawk helicopters,
helicopters, US soldiers
ter. Compromised
retrieve surfollowed
practice by
followed standard
standard practice
by fighting
fighting their
their way
way to the crash
crash site
site to retrieve
survivors.
was far more
more costly
vivors. The
The battle
battle was
costly than anticipated,
anticipated, and
and by the
the end of
of the
night 18 US
US soldiers
soldiers were
were dead,
dead, dozens
dozens more
more were
wounded, and pilot
pilot Michael
Michael
were wounded,
night
Durant
Durant was
was captured.
captured. In addition
addition to US casualties,
casualties, a Malaysian
Malaysian soldier
soldier and
and a
armored UN
UN convoy
Moroccan
soldier who
Moroccan soldier
who were
were part of
of the armored
convoy brought
brought in to extriextricate
cate the Americans
Americans were also killed
killed (Huchthausen
(Huchthausen 2003
2003:: 178). Yet
Vet at the same
same
members of
time,
time, between
between 500
500 and 1,000
1,000 or more
more members
of Aidid's
Aidid's forces
forces were
were killed
killed - in
purely
purely military
military terms,
terms, a remarkable
remarkable asymmetry
asymmetry in favor
favor of
of the United
United States.
States.
The raid also
The
also captured
captured two
two key associates
associates of
of Aidid
Aidid - the targets
targets of
of the mission
mission
(Bowden
(Bowden 1999: 333).
As regards
regards the overall
992 to I1994,
994, material
overall US intervention
intervention from I1992
material gains and
and
losses do not
account for dominant
dominant perceptions
of defeat
defeat in Somalia.
Somalia. Can these
losses
not account
perceptions of
these
perceptions
perceptions be explained
explained by the achievement
achievement of
of US aims?
aims'?
Table 3.2 shows
shows that the United
United States
States achieved
achieved several
several of
of its key aims
aims in
Table
Somalia
other words,
were not incidental).
Somalia (in other
words, its gains
gains were
incidental). The
The major
major motivation
motivation for
for
US intervention
intervention was
52-54; see
see also
also Mueller
Mueller
US
was humanitarian
humanitarian (DiPrizio
(DiPrizio 2002: 52-54;
2004
2004:: 126-127;
126-127; Durch 1996: 319;
319; Western
Western 2002).
2002). Within
Within a few week
weekss the
the
mission had achieved
goals: stabilizing
mission
achieved its core
core goals:
stabilizing the region,
region, enforcing
enforcing a ceasefire.
ceascfire,
building
well ahead
building infrastructure,
infrastructure, and delivering
delivering food.
food. The
The operation
operation proceeded
proceeded well
ahead
of
target of
of schedule,
schedule, finishing
finishing its task in 146 days, rather
rather than the official
official target
of 240
240
days
days (Durch
(Durch 1996: 322).
In contrast,
contrast, UNOSOM
UNOSOM II, which
which took over
over from UNITAF
UNITAF on May 3, 1993.
was
given
a
far
broader
mandate:
to
end
the
civil
war
in Somalia
was given
broader mandate:
civil
Somalia and build
build a
democratic
polity.
Clearly,
in
the
spring
and
summer
of
1993
UNOSOM
II did
democratic polity. Clearly,
spring
summer of
UNOSOM II
did
not come
close to satisfying
come close
satisfying this mandate.
mandate. The
The civil
civil war continued
continued and no demodemocratic
II wa
cratic polity
polity was created.
created. The transition
transition from UNITAF
UNITAF to UNOSOM
UNOSOM II
wass
UNOSOM IIII's
's command
poorly handled,
were many
poorly
handled, and there were
many difficulties
difficulties with UNOSOM
command
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(iain
or
loss'!

Importance

Difficulty

For
leader

For
observer

High

Very high

Moderate

Gain

.~
Q

=

Aim achieved

High

Very high

Moderate

c
=
.~
":;j

Aim partially
achieved
Aim achieved

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate/
Low

Moderate

Aim not
achieved

Very high

Moderate/
High

Aim not
achieved
Not an aim

Moderate

High

Low

.J

Moderate
(chance of
avoiding)
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control, in part because
hastily constructed
constructed and underresourced
underresourced mulrnuland control,
because it was a hastily
tilateral
tilateral force (Weiss
(Weiss 2005: 67; Allard
Allard 1995). Aidid
Aidid was never
never captured,
captured, and in
the Mogadishu
battle, mistakes
they pale next to the
Mogadishu battle,
mistakes were made (although
(although they
Mayaguez
Mayaguez errors).
errors).
Despite
problems, there
progress, includDespite these problems,
there were
were some
some signs
signs of
of material
material progress,
including significant
infrastructure
development,
judicial
reform,
food
aid,
and
the
significant infrastructure development, judicial reform,
of
disease.
Chester
Crocker
(1995:
3)
suggested
that
at
the
least
combating
combating of disease. Chester Crocker (1995:
suggested
the intervention
intervention "knocked
"knocked a hideously
hideously costly,
costly, stalemated
stalemated clan war off
off dead
dead
center and opened
opened the field for local initiatives."
initiatives." Small
Small steps
steps were made towards
center
towards
!l's
goals
in
a
worst-case
environment
for
nation-building.
UNOSOM
UNOSOM II's goals
worst-case environment
nation-building.
Accounting
Accounting for gains
gains and aims,
aims, the US intervention
intervention in Somalia
Somalia can be viewed
viewed
partial success.
success. This,
This, of
of course,
course, clashes
clashes with the
perception of
of
the dominant
dominant perception
as a partial
failure
documented
earlier.
Clearly,
material
events
in
Somalia
were
not
the
failure documented earlier. Clearly, material events
Somalia were
main factors
both
factors driving
driving US evaluations.
evaluations. Having
Having rejected
rejected that
that possibility
possibility for both
Mayaguez and Somalia,
models of
Mayaguez
Somalia, we must
must now consider
consider alternative
alternative models
of how perperceptions
ceptions were
were formed.
formed.

Framework 2: Match-fixing
Match-fixing
Framework
As regards
not base
base
regards both the Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident
Incident and Somalia,
Somalia, observers
observers did not
judgments of
their
their judgments
their
of US success
success and failure
failure on the material
material outcome.
outcome. Instead,
Instead, their
perceptions
perceptions deviated
deviated sharply
sharply from reality,
reality, although
although in opposite
opposite directions.
directions. Why?
Why?
The answer
answer to this puzzling
phenomenon is far more
more than the difference
difference between
between
The
puzzling phenomenon
saving
saving the lives of
of Americans
Americans versus
versus Africans.
Africans. It is explained
explained instead
instead by a
number
psychological and informational
biases: a phenomenon
phenomenon we call
number of
of psychological
informational biases:
"match-fixing."
than weighing
often
"match-fixing." Rather
Rather than
weighing up material
material gains
gains and losses,
losses. people
people often
fix
fix the result
result in their
their minds
minds so that
that one side
side is seen to win or lose,
lose, irrespective
irrespective of
of
happens on the ground.
ground.
what happens
Match-fixing accounts
Match-fixing
accounts for the gap
gap between
between reality
reality and perception
perception via three
three
psychological phenomena:
phenomena: ((I)
1) the mindsets
mindsets of
categories
categories of
of psychological
of observers
observers prior
prior to
event; and (3) the social
pressures during
the event
event;; (2) salient
salient events
events during
during the event;
sucial pressures
during
and after
While as observers
judging outcomes
after the event.
event. While
observers we may believe
believe we are judging
outcomes
fairly and objectively,
conobjectively, we often
often cannot
cannot help but see portentous
portentous international
international conflicts through
a
series
of
subconscious
lenses,
influenced
by
salient
events
through
series of subconscious lenses, influenced
salient events and
and
subject
subject to manipulation
manipulation from the media
media and elites.
elites."8
When judging
judging outcomes,
When
outcomes, people
people first employ
employ an implicit
implicit or explicit
explicit metric
metric
for success:
a
yardstick,
or
set
of
criteria
defining
what
victory
success:
yardstick,
set of criteria defining what victory would
would look
look
like. Second,
incoming i11(ormatio11
detennine whether
thi s
Second. they
they assess
assess incoming
information to determine
whether this
or
not
.
Both
of
these
two
dimensions
metric
and
metric
has
been
achieved
metric
been achieved
not.
of these two dimensions
metric and
information
become biased
events and social
information - can become
biased through
through mindsets,
mindsets, salient
salient events
social
pressures.
pressures.
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Mindsets
Mindsets
An observer's
observer's mindset
rnindset exists
exists before
before the crisi
crisiss or war begins,
begins, and is shaped
sh aped by
such things
national culture,
things as national
culture, ideology,
ideology, and individual
individual experience.
experience. As Yaacov
Yaacov
Vertzbergcr puts it, an individual's
individual's mindset
mindset ""represents
Vertzberger
represents all the hypotheses
hypotheses and
theories
that he is convinced
given moment
time" (1990:
( 1990:
theories that
convinced are valid at a given
moment in time'
111-112; see also McGraw
McGraw 2003
2003:: 394). The mindset
mindset of
of observers
111-112;
observers in 1975 and
1992-1994
mission,
1992-] 994 had a significant
significant influence
influence on how people
people evaluated
evaluated each mission,
affecting
affecting both the metrics
metrics for success
success they employed
employed and the information
information they
deemed
judgment.
deemed relevant
relevant for their
their judgment.

Low
expectations and
Low expectations
and great
great expectations
expectations
Mindset
includes an observer's
observer's expectations
expectations about
about likely
likely outcomes
outcomes 111
III a war,
Mindset includes
notabl
son 2004).
2004 ). ExpectaExpectanotablyy the perceived
perceived chances
chances of
of victory
victory for each side (John
(Johnson
tions ooften
ften represent
baseline against
represent a baseline
against which
which we measure
measure an outcome.
outcome. The
same result
result can look very different
different depending
expectations arc
depending upon whether
whether expectations
high or low.
low . These
expectations are often derived
about recent
recent
These expectations
derived from beliefs
beliefs about
successes make
make observers
observers expect
expect more
more success
success in the future;
future; failhistory: past successes
ures
created low
urcs make observers
observers expect
expect limited
limited gains
gains at best. Recent
Recent history
history created
low
expectations
Mayaguez Incident
success) and
expectations in the Mayaguez
Incident (priming
(priming perceptions
perceptions of
of success)
high expectations
failure) .
expectations in Somalia
Somalia (priming
(priming perceptions
perceptions of
offailure).
new president,
president,
After
tumultuous downfall
downfall of
After the tumultuous
of Richard
Richard Nixon
Nixon in 1974,
1974, the new
Gerald
characteristics. According
According to
Gerald Ford,
Ford, was given
given credit
credit for quite
quite normal
normal characteristics.
Fred Greenstein
elevation to
Greenstein (2000:
(2000: 112), "In the weeks
weeks following
following his abrupt
abrupt elevation
the presidency,
presidency, Ford was showered
showered with praise,
praise, much
of it for attributes
attributes that
much of
that in
another
hi s first nine
nine
another context
context would
would have
have marked
marked him as pedestrian.
pedestrian." " Then,
Then, in his
office, "Ford
racked up a numbe
reversals. He had
months
months of
of office,
"Ford had racked
numberr of
of diplomatic
diplomatic reversals.
appeared
helpl ess in preventing
Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia
appeared helpless
preventing the loss of
of South
South Vietnam,
Laos, and
Cambodia
to communism"
(Wetterhahn 2002: 38). In fact, the Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident
Incident
communism" (Wetterhahn
occurred
weeks after
after the dramatic
dramatic fall of
of Saigon
Saigon to the communists.
occ
urred just
just two weeks
communists.
sis also triggered
Incident, in
The Mayaguez
Mayaguez cri
crisis
triggered memories
memories of
of the 1968 Puehln
Plichta Incident.
which the North Koreans
captured
a
US
ship
and
refused
to
hand
back the
Koreans captured
ship
refused
hand back
crew, in what
humiliating rebuff.
United States
crew,
what was viewed
viewed as a humiliating
rebuff. The United
States in the
sign a letter
back several
months later
end had to sign
Ictter of
of apology
apology to get the men back
several months
later
((Lerner
Lerner 2001
).
200 I).
With the Pueblo
Pueblo Incident,
baseIncident, Watergate,
Watergate, and the defeat
defeat in Vietnam
Vietnam as the baseline,
predisposed to look favorably
Ford 's handling
handling of
of the
line, Americans
Americans were predisposed
favorably on Ford's
Mayag
ucz Incident.
team ending
run, victory
victory was
was all the
Mayagucz
Incident. Like a sports
sports team
ending a losing
losing run,
more desired
desired and all the more
wanted and applauded
more welcome.
welcome. Americans
Ameri cans wanted
applauded a
decisive response.
poll, 76 percent
"A fter losing
losing
decisive
response. In one poll,
percent of
of Americans
Americans agreed
agreed that "After
Vietnam and Cambodi
Cambodia,a, the U.S. had no choice
choice but to take decisive
decisive action,
Vietnam
action, even
even
risking a bigger
risking
bigger war, to get back the ship and crew"
crew" (Harris
(Harris Survey
Survey poll
poll,, May
2327, 1975).
23~27,
1975)
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In complete
In
complete contrast,
contrast, the US intervention
intervention in Somalia
Somalia occurred
occurred during
during a period
period
of
of great
great confidence
confidence in the United States, boosted
boosted by the recent
recent end of
of the Cold
the
War, and the military
military success
success of
of the first Gulf
Gulf War. Somalia
Somalia was
was to be one
one of
ofthe
demonstrations of
of the "new
"new world
world order"
order" - with
with an active
active and effective
effective
first demonstrations
United
Nations - promised
promised by President
United Nations
President Bush
Bush in a speech
speech to the US Congress
Congress on
March 6, 1991. Although
Although many Americans
Americans recognized
recognized that Somali militias
might
might target
target US forces (and therefore
therefore expected
expected some
some fighting),
fighting), the public
public understood
stood the intervention
intervention to be narrowly
narrowly humanitarian
humanitarian in scope
scope and short in duration . This was, after
promised. In
tion.
after all,
all. what
what President
President Bush had promised.
In the early
early days of
the UNIT AF intervention,
intervention, 51
51 percent
percent thought
thought that
that US involvement
involvement would
would be
over
within six months
months (Logan
(Logan 1996: 162;
162: Kohut and
and Toth 1994: 51;
over within
Gallup/Newsweek
poll , December
14.
Gallup/Newsweek poll,
December 3-4,
3--4, 1992; Time/CNN
Time/CNN poll
poll,, January
January 1313-14.
1993; Gallup/Newsweek
Gallup/Newsweek poll, January
January 14-15,
14-15, 1993). Furthermore,
Furthermore, Americans
Americans
were confident
expected success:
success: 77 percent
percent thought
thought that
that the United
United States
States
were
confident and
and expected
would
would achieve
achieve its objectives,
objectives, and only 17
17 percent
percent felt that
that the United
United States
would
withdraw without
having achieved
achieved its objectives
objectives (NBC
(NBC News/Wall
News/Wail Streer
Street
would withdraw
without having
December 12-15,
992).
Journal poll,
Journal
poll, December
12-15, I1992).
The
AF set a high
The early
early successes
successes of
of UNIT
UNITAF
high bar
bar for subsequent
subsequent months.
months. The
press
was ready
waiting for the
the US Marines
Marines when
when they
they stormed
stormed ashore
ashore in
ready and waiting
press was
Somalia
Somalia on assault
assault craft
craft on December
December 9,
9, 1992,
1992, in time
time for
for the evening
evening news
news
many people,
people, this
this was
was the last
last memorable
memorable image
image
in the United
United States.
States. For many
before
before they
they heard
heard about
about dead
dead soldiers
soldiers being
being dragged
dragged through
through the streets
streets of
Mogadishu in October
Mogadishu
October 1993. The initial
initial image
image was one
one of
of hope,
hope, and of
of the
1995: 4) suggested,
United
United States
States acting
acting as the Good
Good Samaritan.
Samaritan. As Crocker
Crocker ((1995:
suggested,
"Perhaps,
ironically, the impressive
and dramatic
"Perhaps, ironically,
impressive leadership,
leadership, coherence,
coherence,
dramatic
success
AF phase
success of
of the U.S.-led
U.S.-led UNIT
UNITAF
phase made
made it look
look too easy,
easy, facilitating
facilitating the
'mission
creep' that
'mission creep'
that produced
produced UNOSOM
UNOSOM 11
II's's vast
vast nation-building
nation-building mandate.'"
mandate."
These
positive expectations
These positive
expectations all combined
combined to make
make later
later reverses
reverses seem
seem like
like a
shocking failure
shocking
failure. .

Pet loves,
pet hates:
Per
loves, per
hares: rescues,
rescues, nation-building
nation-building and Vietnam
Vietnam
American observers
American
observers typically
typically adopt
adopt a completely
completely different
different attitude
attitude toward
toward
rescue
rescue missions
missions as opposed
opposed to civil
civil war
war interventions
interventions or nation-building.
nation-building.
Americans like
rescue missions,
Americans
like rescue
missions, are willing
willing to pay
pay a high
high price
price for them,
them, and
select as virtually
select
virtually the only
only metric
metric for success
success whether
whether or not the hostages
hostages arc
released.
released. Captured
Captured Americans
Americans represent
represent an extraordinarily
extraordinarily salient
salient issue
issue. . In
In
May
May 1971,
1971,6868 percent
percent of
of Americans
Americans favored
favored withdrawal
withdrawal from South
South Vietnam
Vietnam
before
before the end of
of the year,
year, but only
only 11
II percent
percent favored
favored withdrawal
withdrawal if this
this
action
even "threatened"
action even
"threatened" the lives
lives or safety
safety of
of US
US prisoners
prisoners of
of war
war held
held by
North
Vietnam (Mueller
North Vietnam
(Mueller 2002: 184-185;
184-185; Mueller
Mueller 1973).
1973). Most
Most Americans
Americans were
were
willing
war, at the cost
cost of
of hundreds
hundreds or thousands
thousands of
of additional
additional
willing to continue
continue the war,
casualties,
casualties, rather than put a few
few hundred
hundred prisoners
prisoners at risk. In a similar
similar vein,
vein, the
Iranian hostage
hostage crisis
crisis came
came to dominate
dominate Carter's
Carter's presidency.
presidency. In
In the typical
typical
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American
American POW-hostage
POW-hostage schema,
schema, everything
everything depends
depends on getting
getting the prisoners
prisoners
released
released. . If
lf this can be done
done,, casualties
casualties and Rambo-esque
Rambo-esque collateral
collateral damage
damage
represent a price
price well
paying.
represent
well worth paying.
In
In stark contrast,
contrast, Americans
Americans simply
simply do not like interventions
interventions in civil wars or
nation-building.
nation-building. Polls suggest
suggest that Americans
Americans are quite favorable
favorable towards
towards the
restrain the aggressive
use of
of force to restrain
aggressive foreign
foreign policies
policies of
of other
other states,
states, and are
also sympathetic
sympathetic to the use of
of force for strictly
strictly humanitarian
humanitarian operations.
operations.
However,
However, the US public
public has generally
generally been averse
averse to intervening
intervening in civil wars.
Bruce Jentleson
Jentleson and Rebecca
Rebecca Britton
Britton (1998)
(1998) demonstrated
demonstrated that Americans
Americans have
little stomach
stomach for engendering
engendering internal political
political change
change (see also Russett
Russett and
Nincic 1976: 411-423;
411-423; Chicago
Chicago Council
Council on Foreign
Foreign Relations
Relations 2002). From the
start in Somalia,
Somalia, Americans
Americans were reluctant
reluctant to go beyond
beyond the delivery
delivery of
of aid and
attempt
working government,
attempt to create
create a working
government, and this reluctance
reluctance influenced
influenced the way
In which
which the success
of the mission
mission was perceived
perceived (Logan
(Logan 1996: 163).
in
success of
One of
of the reasons
reasons Americans
Americans dislike nation-building
nation-building is that they tend to believe
operations will fail. Recent US nation-building
nation-building missions
missions in Haiti, Bosnia, and
such operations
Kosovo were all quite
quite successful
successful but came to be judged
judged by Americans
Americans as failures
Tierney 2006). In
In such missions,
missions, Americans
Americans often employ
employ metrics for
(Johnson and Tierney
success based on US ideals that are almost impossible
success
impossible to attain. Success in Somalia
involved a political dimension
dimension (ending a multi-party
multi-party civil war, building
building a
representative
representative regime,
regime, winning
winning hearts and minds), and therefore
therefore American
American
observers
observers tended to utilize US values as the basis for their evaluations.
evaluations. Instead of
of
considering
considering how much
much Somalia had improved
improved following US intervention,
intervention, Americans focused on the gap between US standards
standards of
of democracy
democracy and stability
stability and the
Somalia. Only if the conflict between
between warring Somali factions were
situation in Somalia.
resolved and a stable
stable democracy
democracy installed would
would Americans
Americans feel
feel certain
certain that the
mission had been a success. In contrast, Mayaguez
Mayaguez was seen as a rescue
rescue mission
without a political component
component in
in which everything
everything hinged
hinged on releasing
releasing the
hostages
hostages..
Memories of
of Vietnam
Vietnam worked
worked in opposite
opposite ways in our two case studies.
studies. In
In
Memories
I 975, very recent
1975,
recent memories
memories of
of the defeat
defeat in Vietnam
Vietnam set a low threshold
threshold for
success.
success. In 1992-1994,
1992-1994, more distant
distant memories
memories of
of Vietnam
Vietnam made Americans
Americans
inclined to perceive
perceive failure in what they saw as analogous
analogous circumstances.
circumstances. The
inclined
decisive
decisive resolve
resolve demonstrated
demonstrated in the Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident
Incident shone
shone as a bright
bright light
against the drawn-out
drawn-out defeat
defeat in Vietnam,
against
Vietnam, while
while in 1993 Somalia
Somalia seemed
seemed to be a
quagmire
redux. Memories
quagmire redux.
Memories of
of Vietnam
Vietnam helped
helped to create
create latent
latent fears about
about the
United
United States
States getting
getting bogged
bogged down in an unwinnable
unwinnable war in Somalia
Somalia against
against a
shadowy
shadowy enemy
enemy in civilian
civilian clothes
clothes (Hirsch
(Hirsch and Oakley
Oakley 1995: 155). Between
Between
October
October 22 and October
October 26, 1993, 62 percent
percent of
of Americans
Americans thought
thought that US
intervention
intervention in Somalia
Somalia "could
"could tum
turn into another
another Vietnam,"
Vietnam," even though
though over
over a
thousand
Americans died in Vietnam
linton
thousand times
times as many
many Americans
Vietnam as in Somalia,
Somalia, and C
Clinton
had already
already announced
announced a plan for withdrawal
withdrawal (NBC
(NBC News/Washington
News/Washington Post poll,
October 22-26,
October
22-26, 1993
1993).).
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Salient events
events
Salient
Certain salient
promote an image
image of
of victory,
victory, defeat
Certain
salient events
events can promote
defeat or a draw.
draw. Many
Many
such events,
events, of
ought to feature
feature in a score-keeping
of course,
course, ought
score-keeping analysis,
such as batanalysis, such
battlefield victories,
victories, material
gains and so on. However,
tlefield
material gains
However, we focus
focus here
here on the
the role
of
sy mbolic events
events that
that do not represent
of symbolic
represent tangible
side, but nevernevertangible gains
gains for either
either side,
theless
heavily influence
influence perceptions
perception s of
victory and
and defeat.
theless heavily
of victory
defeat. People
People tend
tend to gencrgeneralize from specific
phenomena to universal
universal conclusions,
alize
specific phenomena
conclusions, and
and see in symbolic
symbolic
events a microcosm
microcosm of
events
of the bigger
bigger picture.
picture.
The phrase
phrase "Black
" Black Hawk
Hawk Down"
Down" still encapsulates
encapsulates the disbelief,
di sbelief, disaster,
disaster, and
shock that accompanied
accompanied the unfolding
unfolding chaos
shock
chaos in Mogadishu
Mogadishu on October
October 3,
3, 1993.
number of
Mogadishu firefight came
A number
of separate
separate events
events in the Mogadishu
came to have
enormous
have enormous
sy
mbolic power,
power, representing
representing many
many people's
people's primary
source of
symbolic
primary source
arion with
of inform
information
which to judge
judge mctrics
metrics about
about the entire
which
Somalia intervention.
events in
entire Somalia
intervention. The events
October did
did not turn
turn an enthusiastic
enthusiastic public
public against
against the mission
October
missi on (most
(most Americans
American s
were already
skeptical by September),
were
already skeptical
September), but the images
images did strongly
entrench critstrongly entrench
ical appraisals
appraisals and
and produce
produce new skeptics.
skeptics.
In the battle,
battle, Somalis
Somalis captured
Michael Durant)
In
captured Michael
one of
of
Durant, the surviving
surviving pilot
pilot of
of one
two downed
helicopters. The image
downed helicopters.
image of
of Durant
cover
Durant as a prisoner
prisoner plastered
plastered the cover
of
Newsweek and U.S.
News and
and World Report,
Report. The bodies
of Time, Newsweek
u.s. NelVS
Amerbodi es of
of dead Americans were
were also infamously
infamously paraded
paraded through
through Mogadishu
icans
Mogadishu, , stripped
stripped and mutilated,
mutilated,
of which
which was broadcast
broadcast around
world on CNN.
all of
around the world
These events
CNN. These
events were
were the
lead story
on
all
the
major
networks
from
October
5
until
story
major networks
October
October
October 9, often
often assoassociated with
with the tag-line
tag-line of
of America's
America's "humiliation."
ciated
majority of
Ameri"humiliation." A large
large majority
of Americans claimed
images, and Washington
Washington was
calls
claimed to have seen
seen the images,
deluged
was quickly
quickly deluged
with phone
phone calls
call s demanding
pullout. Congressmen
demanding a pullout.
Congressmen often
often referred
referred to the images
images
angry speeches
insisting on withdrawal."
withdrawal. 9
in angry
speeches insisting
These
events in October
October were
often explicitly
explicitly compared
compared with the arrival
arrival of
These events
were often
of
the Marines
Marines back
back in December
1992.
Observers contrasted
snapshots from
December ]992. Observers
contrasted snapshots
from
December and October
largely ignored
ignored or missed
missed what
what had happened
December
October and largely
happened in
between.
Michael
Maren commented
between. Michael Maren
commented that
A cartoon
cartoon by Oliphant
Oliphant seemed
seemed to sum
most Americans.
Americans. In
sum it up for most
frame
one,
a
soldier
hungry Somali
child. In frame two the
frame one, soldier is feeding
feeding a hungry
Somali child.
child shoots
shoots the soldier.
of that cartoon
cartoon hung
hung in the offices
child
soldier. Copies
Copies of
offices and
and
barracks of
of the American
American military.
military .
barracks
(1997: 213)
213)
(1997:
According to two insiders
insiders on the Hill, Harry
Harry Johnston
According
Johnston and
and Ted Dagnc.
Dagnc. "The
"The
gruesome
television footage
footage of
dead American
American soldiers
gruesome television
of dead
soldiers being
dragged in the
being dragged
streets of
militia forced even
who had supported
supported the
streets
of Mogadishu
Mogadishu by Somali
Somali militia
even those
those who
the
U.S. engagement
engagement in Somalia
Somalia to call for disengagement"
disengagement" ((1997:
1997: 195195-196).
196).
irony in comparing
comparing our
our two
two cases
cases is striking:
striking: the capture
capture of
The irony
Michael
of Michael
Durant
Somalia was front-page
front-page news, but Americans
Durant in Somalia
Americans in 1975 were unaware
unaware
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that three
three US soldiers
soldiers were left behind
behind on Koh Tang. Unlike
Unlike Durant
Durant (who
(who was
released
shortly afterwards),
of those
those left behind
were executed
behind in 1975 were
executed
released shortly
afterwards), all three
three of
(Wetterhahn 2002: 257-264).
Mayaguez Incident,
Incident, Americans
instead
257-264). In the Mayaguez
Americans instead
(Wetterhahn
focused on the dramatic
dramatic rescue
rescue operation.
operation. The Wall Street
Street Journal
Journal on May 16,
focused
episode that had all the elements
Flynn swash1975 called
called it "an episode
elements of
of an Errol Flynn
swashbuckler." The
of the rescue
mission created
created the impression
impression of
of US control,
control,
rescue mission
buckler."
The style of
and control
control in turn created
created the impression
impression of
of US victory.
victory. Having
Having ordered
ordered miliaction, and declared
declared victory,
victory, Ford held a publicly
publicly commanding
commanding position
position
tary action,
throughout.
throughout.
Finally, the Mayaguez
Incident gained
gained salience
salience because
because Americans,
Americans, and even
even
Finally,
Mayaguez Incident
the US government,
government, saw the seizure
seizure as a deliberate
attack on US interests.
interests. ConCondeliberate attack
forming to the well-known
well-known "fundamental
"fundamental attribution
attribution error,"
error," in which
which people
people tend
forming
assume devious
devious intentions
intentions behind
behind behavior
behavior that third parties
parties would
would see as
to assume
simplyy the product
of circumstances,
of knowledge
knowledge about
about the Mayaguez
Mayaguez
circumstances, a lack of
simpl
product of
Incident contributed
contributed to perceptions
perceptions of
of the crisis
crisis as a military
military confrontation
confrontation
Incident
requiring
forceful response
response (Tetlock
(Tetlock 1998). More attention
attention to Cambodian
Cambodian
requiring a forceful
regional
concerns might
might have
have revised
view. The Mayaguez
Mayaguez was seized
seized not
regional concerns
revised this view.
just
just anywhere,
anywhere, but close
close to Puolo Wai island,
island, the focus of
of the increasingly
increasingly
hostile territorial
territorial dispute
dispute between
between Cambodia
Cambodia and Vietnam
(Becker 1986: 195).
Vi etnam (Becker
hostile
There
both countries
were mobilizing
mobilizing soldiers
There was oil in the area, and both
countries were
soldiers to stake
stake
their claims.
claims. "By
early May,"
May," writes
Elizabeth Becker,
Becker, "the
"the Khmer
Khmer Rouge
Rouge were
"By early
writes Elizabeth
were
their
concerned with Vietnamese
Vietnamese designs
designs on sacred
sacred Khmer
Khmer soil that they
they began
so concerned
began
stopping all foreign
foreign ships
ships cruising
cruising in the area"
area" (ibid.: 195). A Panamanian
Panamanian and a
stopping
Swedish
Most important,
Swedish ship
ship had recently
recently been challenged.
challenged. Most
important, and often ignored,
ignored,
is the fact that it was only on the early
early morning
morning of/
of J 2 May
May - the very day of
of the
Moyaguez
seizure
Rouge had sent soldiers
soldiers to Puolo Wai itself
Mayaguez se
izure -~ that the Khmer
Khmer Rouge
itself

and assert[
ed] Ca
mbodian claims
morning
assert[ed]
Cambodian
claims to the island
island.....
.. Later that morning
Mayaguez sailed
sailed so close
close to
an American
American merchant
merchant ship named
named the Mayaguez
that the Khmer
navy, under
under orders
orders to protect
Puolo Wai that
Khmer Rouge
Rouge navy,
protect the
island from foreign
foreign invasion,
invasion, stopped
stopped and seized
seized the ship. The operaoperacarried out by patrol
Southwestern Zone
Zone with
tion was carried
patrol boats
boats from the Southwestern
contact to Phnom
Officials in Washington
Washington learned
learned about
about
no direct
direct contact
Phnom Penh. Officials
the seizure
seizure before
before the party
party did in Phnom
Phnom Penh [who claimed
claimed they
of it later
later on Voice of
America radio).
of America
radio] .
heard of
195-196)
(ibid.: 195-196)
States perceived
deliberate attack
attack on its shipping
shipping in interWhat the United States
perceived as a deliberate
national waters
waters to test
test its resolve
resolve and credibility
credibility was in reality
reality a mistake.
mistake.
national
Viewing the seizure
seizure of
of the Mayaguez
Mayaguez as an immoral
immoral act of
of aggression,
aggression, AmeriAmeriViewing
cans tended
tended to look favorably
response.
cans
favorably on the US response.
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Social
pressures
Social pressures
Social
pressures represent
represent the ways
Social pressures
ways in which
which the media,
media, elites,
elites. and other
other groups
groups
influence
influence perceptions
perceptions of
of victory
victory. . Such factors
factors act as a deliberate
deliberate "push"
"push" into one
particular way of
thinking, which
particular
of thinking,
which may either
either augment
augment or counter
counter the "pull"
"pull" of
psychological phenomena
the other
other psychological
phenomena outlined
outlined above.
above.

Media
Media
Media
biases worked
worked in opposite
Media biases
opposite directions
directions in our two case
case studies.
studies. In Somalia
Somalia
media witnessed
the media
witnessed mistakes
mistakes and carnage
carnage at first hand,
hand, but in the Mayaguez
Mayaguez
Incident the media
media were
Incident
were not physically
present and, as a result,
result, tended
tended to accept
accept
physically present
view of
of what
the official
official view
what happened.
happened. The short
short timescale
timescale of
of the Mayaguez
Mayaguoz crisis
crisis
meant that
meant
that the media
were unable
unable to conduct
conduct detailed
detailed investigations
investigations into the
media were
operation
contrast to Somalia).
operation (in contrast
Somalia). There
There was also
also little time
time for the customary
customary
public opinion
dissipate into more
public
opinion and media
media rally effect
effect to dissipate
critical attitudes
attitudes
more critical
(again
(again in contrast
contrast to Somalia).
Somalia). Interestingly,
Interestingly, the media
media were
supportive about
about
were supportive
both Mayaguez
both
Mayaguez and Somalia
Somalia in the first few weeks,
weeks, a timescale
timescale that encapsulated
encapsulated
the whole
whole of
of the Mayaguez
Mayaguez operation,
operation, but only the first phase
phase of the mission
mission in
Somalia.
Perceptions
of
success
are
more
likely
Somalia. Perceptions of success
more
entire operation
operation is over
over
if the entire
before the
the media
media honeymoon
honeymoon wears
before
wears off.
There
There were
were also important
important differences
differences in what
what the media
media reported
reported in 1975 and
1993.
1993. After
After the October
October 1993 raid in Somalia,
Somalia, the media
focused on US casualcasualmedia focused
ties and ungrateful
ungrateful Somalis,
ties
Somalis, which
which became
became a powerful
powerful argument
argument for withdrawal.
withdrawal.
same time,
time, the media
At the same
media tended
tended to ignore
ignore the large pro-American
pro-American demonstrademonstrations in Somalia.
Somalia. These
tions
These decisions
decisions about
about the selective
selective presentation
presentation of
of the views
views
of
ordinary Somalis
of ordinary
Somalis mattered
mattered because
because in October
October 1993, 88 percent
of Americans
Americans
percent of
supported withdrawal
withdrawal if
supported
if the Somalis
Somalis wanted
wanted the United
United States
States to leave, but
hut 54
percent of
Americans would
percent
of Americans
would "definitely"
"definitely" or "probably"
"probably" support
support the United
United States
States
staying if
if a "substantial
staying
"substantial majority"
majority" of
of Somalis
Somalis wanted
wanted the Americans
Americans to stay.
Crucially,
percent of
Crucially, 58 percent
of Americans
Americans thought
thought that most Somalis
Somalis wanted
wanted the United
United
States
unknown ((Kull
Kull and Destler
States to leave.
leave. The real figure for Somali
Somali opinion
opinion is unknown
Destler
1999:
I 07- I 08; National
National Research
18, 1993
). Outside
1999: 107-108;
Research Inc
lnc.,., October
October 1515-18,
1993).
Outside of
of
Mogadishu the mission
mission had restored
Mogadishu
restored a good
good deal of
of order,
order, but media
media coverage
coverage
concentrated
overwhelmingly on the capital.
concentrated overwhelmingly
capital. A review
review of
of articles
articles in
in the Ne1r
New
York Times in October
October 1993 found
found that rural areas
areas received
received almost
almost no menti
mention
on these being
being the areas
areas where
these
where success
success in
in delivering
delivering food and in improving
improving infrainfrastructure
was starkest
starkest ((Logan
Logan 1996: 175). US Congressman
structure was
Congressman Richard
Richard Gephardt
Gephardt
reporters on October
levitold reporters
October 5,
5. "There
"There is a great
great success
success story
story here that the te
television pictures
pictures don't
).
don't always
always show"
show" (Sharkey
(Sharkey 1993
1993).
There was also a significant
There
significant change
change in media
reporting about
about Somalia.
Somalia. The
media reporting
media
portrayed the initial weeks
media portrayed
weeks of
of the Somalia
Somalia intervention
intervention in laudatory
laudatory tcnm,.
terms.
Photographers and film crews
Photographers
crews were
were waiting
waiting for the Marines
Marines when they hit the
beach, and presented
presented the intervention
mission of
beach,
intervention as a low-cost
low-cost mission
of mercy
mercy (Da
(Dauber
uber
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200
I: 211
2001:
211).). Because
Because of
of the way this overly
overly rosy view of the situation
situation was
created, later difficulties
difficulties set the scene
scene for a sharp reversal
reversal in media treatment.
treatment.
According
Andrew Kohut and Robert
Robert Toth
Toth (1994: 53), Somalia
Somalia also
also "illus"illusAccording to Andrew
media to be almost
trates the capacity
capacity of
of the media
almost embarrassingly
embarrassingly enthusiastic
enthusiastic for a
mission, then tum
tum abruptly
abruptly against
against it when pictures
pictures of the human
human cost begin
begin to
appear
homes."
appear in human
human homes."
Whereas
Whereas the media
media in 1993 encouraged
encouraged an image of defeat,
defeat, in 1975 they
largely followed
followed the administration
administration line about
about US success.
success. Unlike
Unlike those for
Somalia, media
media reports
reports of
of the Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident
Incident relied
relied almost
almost solely
solely on
information drip-fed
drip-fed from the US government,
government, largely
largely because
because there
there were no
information
reporters on the scene.
reporters
scene. John Casserly,
Casserly, Ford's
Ford's speechwriter,
speech writer, noted
noted in his diary for
16, 1975:
May 16,
Banner
Banner headlines
headlines stream
stream across
across the nation's
nation's newspapers,
newspapers, U.S. Marines
Marines
dramatically
dramatically recaptured
recaptured the American
American merchant
merchant ship Mayaguez
Mayaguez ..
... . .
The White House
House staff
staff is jubilant.
jubilant. ...... The Style section
section of
of the WashingWashingnotes that
that President
danced into the night after
after words
words of
of
ton Post notes
President Ford danced
praise
Shah of
of Iran.
praise from the Shah
(Casserly 1977:
1977: 90-91)
90-91)
(Casserly
Initial media estimates
estimates for US casualties
casualties on Koh Tang
Tang were extremely
extremely low, and
the media were unaware
unaware at first that 23 US servicemen
servicemen had died in a helicopter
helicopter
crash as part of
rescue mission
of the rescue
mission (Wetterhahn
(Wetterhahn 2002: 313
313).). The Wall Street
Street
Journal noted on May 16,
Journal
16, 1975, "Preliminary
"Preliminary indications
indications are that at least two
U.S. servicemen
servicemen was [sic] killed and many were
were wounded."
wounded." This
This misinformation
misinformation
enough for the image
image of
of victory
victory to stick.
lasted long enough

Elites
Niccolo Machiavelli
wrote in
in The Prince
Prince that
that leaders
leaders need
need not have
have all the
Niccolo
Machiavelli wrote
princely
princely qualities,
qualities, but they "should
"should certainly
certainly appear
appear to have them"
them" (2005)
(2005). . In the
same way,
need not actually
way, leaders
leaders need
actually win a war or crisis
crisis outright,
outright, but if they want
to survive
survive politically,
politically, they should
should appear
appear to do so
so.. Here we contrast
contrast Ford
Ford's' s
effectiveness
Mayaguez as a success
effectiveness in framing
framing Mayagucz
success with Clinton's
Clinton's failure
failure to frame
Somalia
(Of course,
Somalia as a success.
success. (Of
course, elites
elites also have
have an interest
interest in framing
framing the war
as legitimate
legitimate as Merom
Merom points
points out in this volume,
volume, Chapter
Chapter 8).
"If
incident was a victory,"
"If the [Mayaguez]
[Mayaguez] incident
victory," wrote John Greene,
Greene, "it was one
of
icy implementation"
1995:
of crisis
crisis management
management rather
rather than of
of substantive
substantive pol
policy
implementation" ((1995:
151
). Ford and Secretary
151).
Secretary of
of State Henry Kissinger
Kissinger were both concerned
concerned to stand
- and be seen to stand
stand - firrn
finn over Mayaguez,
Mayaguez, to create
create the image
image of
of resolve,
resolve, for
domestic and international
both domestic
international consumption.
consumption. The Mayaguez
Mayagucz Incident
Incident provided
provided
a second
second chance
chance to end the Vietnam
Vietnam War, this
this time with an illusory
illusory success.
success.
Rather
Rather than helicopters
helicopters pulling
pulling desperate
desperate people
people off
off rooftops
rooftops in Saigon,
Saigon, here the
helicopters were landing
landing Marines
Marines in a dramatic
dramatic show of
of force. On May 14,
helicopters
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Kissinger told Ford, "This
"This is your
your first crisis.
crisis. You should
should establish
establish a reputation
reputation
Kissinger
being too tough
tough to tackle."
tackle."!"10 After
After the crisis
crisis was over,
over, Kissinger
Kissinger told Ford.
Ford.
for being
"The
operation was conducted
"The whole
whole operation
conducted not as a military
military operation
operation but in order
order to
demagogue before
before Congress.
Congress. You got a helluva
helluva lot out of
of it."
it.""11 Ford later
later stated
stated
demagogue
operation reassured
reassured American
American allies
allies and warned
warned America's
America's enemies
enemies that
that the operation
the United
United States
States "was
"was not a helpless
helpless giant"
giant" (Ford 1979: 282). This metric
metric for
success - "not
"not being
being a helpless
helpless giant"
giant" - was of
of course
course easily
easily attained
attained by the
success
most
most powerful
powerful military
military in the world.
world.
The
The administration
administration was
was concerned
concerned with how the rescue
rescue strategy
strategy should
should be
presented to the
public, Ford's
Ford's initial
initial press
release framed
framed the seizure
seizure as
presented
the US public.
press release
"an act of
attempt to impugn
impugn the honor
honor and credibility
credibility of
of the
"an
of piracy"
piracy" and an attempt
United
United States.
States."12 In Kansas
Kansas City,
City, Kissinger
Kissinger "pounded
"pounded the podium
podium with
unabashed enthusiasm,"
enthusiasm:' expressing
expressing outrage
outrage at the Mayaguez
Mayaguez seizure.
seizure. When
When a
unabashed
asked when
when the incident
incident might
might be resolved.
resolved.
Time magazine
magazine correspondent
correspondent asked
Kissinger
replied, "I know
Kissinger replied,
know your
your magazine's
magazine's deadline
deadline. . I think
think we can meet
meet if"
it"
(Wetterhahn
2002:: 81). At the NSC meeting
meeting on the evening
evening of
of May 13,
13, Ford's
Ford's
(Wetterhahn 2002
advisor
Robert Hartmann
Hartmann noted
noted that "The
"The crisis,
crisis, like the Cuban
Cuban missile
missile crisis,
crisis.
advisor Robert
is the first
first real test of
of your
your leadership.
leadership. What
What you decide
decide is not as important
important as
what the
what
the public
public perceives.
perceives."!'"u
The White
White House
House successfully
successfully managed
managed to control
control information
information throughout
throughout
The
the
the Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident.
Ineident. For example,
example, reporters
reporters explicitly
explicitly asked
asked whether
whether Ford
had altered
altered US military
military operations
operations once
once he received
received the Cambodian
Cambodian broadcast
broadcast
had
suggesting the Mayaguez
about to be released
released. . Press
Press Secretary
Secretary Ron
suggesting
Mayaguez was about
Nessen
Nessen stated
stated that
that military
military operations
operations were
were already
already under
under way before then.
then.
"and certainly
certainly were
were well underway
underway before
before a translation
translation reached
reached here
here."!'
"and
."'• The
administration encouraged
encouraged an overall
overall impression
impression that
that military
military action
action had
administration
directly
caused the release
directly caused
release of
of the crew.
crew. Secretary
Secretary of
of Defense
Defense James
James R.
R.
Schlesinger released
released a statement
statement on May 15
15 announcing
announcing the "successful
"successful
Schlesinger
actions of
of the U.S.
U.S. forces,
forces, associated
associated with the recovery
recovery of the SS
actions
MAY
AGUEZ and its entire
MA
YAGUEZ
entire crew."
crew."" 15 Nessen
Nessen pressed
pressed home
home this image
image of direct
direct
cause and
and effect
effect in a press
press briefing:
briefing:
cause
NESSEN: ...
... as the President
President indicated
indicated in his statement,
statement, the operation
operation has ended
ended
NESSEN:

by achieving
achieving totally
totally its objective,
objective, which
which was the freeing
freeing of
of the ship and the
freeing of
tile entire
entire crew
crew unharmed.
unharmed.
freeing
of the
UNIDENTIFIED
REPORTER: Does the President
President feel a sense
sense of triumph
triumph at the
UNIDENTIFIED
REPORTER:
concl usion of
of this?
conclusion
NESSEN:
NESSEN: I think his own words
words spoke
spoke for themselves
themselves and the fact is that the
mission successfully
successfully accomplished
accomplished its goal.
goal."16
mission
press briefing
briefing the next day, May 16,
16, a reporter
reporter asked Nessen.
Nessen.
In an informal
informal press
"Ron, can you get us some
some reactions
reactions from the President
President on how he feels about
about
"Ron,
the fact that the casualties
casualties almost
almost number
number as many,
many, or more,
more, as the crew
crew
members
MA YAGUEZ')"
(casualties actually
actually remained
remained unknown
unknown at that
members on the MAY
AGUEZ?" (casualties
point)."
replied, "The
"The operation
operation succeeded
succeeded in accomplishing
accomplishing its objecobjecpoint). 17 Nessen
Nessen replied,
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tive,
rive. which
which was
was purely
purely and
and simply
simply - and
and no
no other
other objective
objective - other
other than
than to free
free
the
the crew
crew and
and the
the ship.
ship. So,
So, it was
was successful."
successful.':" 18 Ford's
Ford's declaration
declaration on
on television
television
about the
the release
release of
of the
the crew
crew was
was selective
best:
selective at best:
about
United
tonight boarded
the American
American merchant
merchant ship
United States
States forces
forces tonight
boarded the
ship SS
55
Mayaguez
landed at the
Island of
Mayaguez and
and landed
the Island
of Koh
Koh Tang
Tang for
for the
the purpose
purpose of
of resrescuing
the crew
cuing the
crew and
and the
the ship
ship ...... the
the vessel
vessel has
has been
been recovered
recovered intact
intact and
and
the entire
has been
that have
have successfully
the
entire crew
crew has
been rescued.
rescued. The
The forces
forces that
successfully
accomplished
this
hostile fire but
accomplished
this mission
mission are
are still
still under
under hostile
but are
are preparing
preparing
to disengage.
disengage.
(Wetterhahn
2002: 205)
(Wetterhahn 2002:
205)
Wetterhahn notes,
notes, "A
"A solid
solid case
case can
can be
be made
made that
that the
the administration
administration
deliberAs Wetterhahn
deliberately
withheld the
ately withheld
the true
true casualty
casualty figures
figures to foster
foster a maximum
maximum amount
amount of
of enthusienthusiasm for
for the
the president
and the
the military's
handling of
of the
the affair."
affair." Both
Both the
the White
White
asm
president and
military's handling
House and
the Pentagon
knew of
23 killed
the helicopter
helicopter
crash, for
for
House
and the
Pentagon knew
of the
the 23
killed in the
crash,
example, but
but this
this was
was "kept
"kept secret
secret from
from the
the press
press for
for over
over a week.
week. When
When it was
example,
was
finally released,
released, the
the Pentagon
claimed that
the men
men were
were not
not part
of the
operafinally
Pentagon claimed
that the
part of
the operation" (Wetterhahn
2002: 257).
257), According
According
to John
Greene, the
the record
of the
tion"
(Wetterhahn 2002:
to
John Greene,
record of
the
decision-making
discussions over
over Mayaguez
Mayaguez would
would
decision-making
discussions

White House
Ford's
offer
more than
offer little
little marc
than evidence
evidence of
of White
House concern
concern with
with Ford's
image: they
were positioning
positioning the
the outcome
outcome of
of the
the crisis
crisis even
even before
before it
image:
they were
was
published memories
of the
the participants
so
was over.
over. Indeed,
Indeed, the
the published
memories of
participants are
are so
completely
at odds
completely
odds with
with the
the archival
archival record
record that
that one
one must
must call
call into
into
question the
of those
those writers.
writers.
question
the intent
intent of
(1995
(1995: : 150)
150)
Elite manipulation
manipulation
continued in the
the weeks
after the
the crisis
crisis as
as well.
well. The
The adminadminElite
continued
weeks after
istration
made considerable
considerable
efforts to try
try to
block declassification
declassification
of the
General
istration made
efforts
to block
of
the General
Accounting
Office (GAO)
(GAO) Report
Repott on
on the
the Mayaguez
which painted
an
Accounting Office
Mayaguez Incident,
Incident, which
painted an
extremely negative
negative picture
picture of
of the
decision making,
and the
extremely
the decision
making, military
military planning,
planning, and
the
operation itself.
itself."19 Along
Along with
with broad
broad derogation
derogation from
from the
the State
State Department,
Department,
Penoperation
Pentagon, , and
and White
White House,
House, Deputy
Deputy Under
Secretary of
of State
State Lawrence
Lawrence S.
S, EagleEagletagon
Under Secretary
burger called
called the
the report
report ""totally
and misleading,"
and suggested
burger
totally inadequate
inadequate and
misleading," and
suggested that
that
the authors
authors "went
"went out
out of
of their
their way
way to
to develop
develop wholly
fictional diplomatic
diplomatic scenarscenarthe
wholly fictional
ios which
which bore
bore no
no resemblance
resemblance
fact or
or reality
reality, , and
and then
then criticized
criticized the
the AdminAdminios
to fact
istration for
for its 'failure'
'failure' to
to pursue
pursue their
their fantasies."
fanrasies.?"20
istration
Ford went
went on
on to
the Mayaguez
crisis to great
great effect
effect in the
presidenFord
to use
use the
Mayaguez crisis
the 1976
I976 presidential elections.
elections. When
When he
announced
his
decision to
stand, on
on July
July 8,
8, 1976,
1976, the
the
tial
he announced
his decision
to stand,
New York Times "established
"established
him as the
the 'clear
'clear favorite'
favorite' to
win the
the 1976
1976 elecelechim
to win
tion," citing
citing the
the Mayaguez
Mayaguez incident
incident as one
one of
of his
his top
top three
secrets to success
success
tion,"
three secrets
(Casserly
1977: 115).
115), In the
1976 presidential
presidential
debates, when
when asked
the
(Casserly
1977:
the 1976
debates,
asked about
about the
GAO report,
report, Ford
Ford had
one of
of his
his best
best moments:
moments:
GAO
had one
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Somebody who sits in Washington,
Washington, D.C. 18
Somebody
18 months
months after
after the Mayaguez
Mayaguez
incident can
can be
be a very
very good
good grandstand
grandstand quarterback.
incident
quarterback. And
And let
let me
me make
make
another observation:
this morning
morning I got
got a call
another
observation: this
call from
the skipper
from the
skipper of
of the
the
Mayaguez; he
he was
was furious
because he told
told me
Mayaguez;
furious because
me that
that it was
was the
the action
action of
of
me, President
Ford, that
that saved
the lives
lives of
of the
me,
President Ford,
saved the
the crew
crew of
of the Mayaguez.
Mayaguez.
And I can
can assure
assure you
you that if we
we had
had not
not taken
And
taken the
the strong
strong and forceful
forceful
action
did, we
have been
action that we
we did,
we would
would have
criticized very,
very, very
severely
been criticized
very severely
back and not
not moving."
moving .21
for sitting
sitting back
Ford's opponent,
opponent, Jimmy
Jimmy Carter,
Carter, then
then declined
declined an opportunity
Ford's
opportunity in the debate
debate to
critique the
the President'S
President's performance
perfonnance over
over Mayaguez,
critique
Mayaguez, even
even when
when handed
handed the
the
apparent golden
golden opportunity
opportunity of
of the
GAO report.
Carter confirmed
apparent
the GAO
report. Instead,
Instead, Carter
confinned that
that
the United
United States
to move
aggressively to
to rescue
rescue the
the
States had to
move aggressively
the crew.
crew. Carter
Carter either
either
accepted the
the dominant
dominant frame
of US
US success
success in 1975,
accepted
frame of
1975, or
politically
or thought
thought it politically
unwise to
to query
query that
unwise
frame.
that frame.
The
victory continues
propagated. At the
the Gerald
The image
image of
of victory
continues to be propagated.
Gerald Ford PresiPresidential Museum
Museum in Grand
Grand Rapids,
Rapids, Michigan,
the display
display on the
dential
Michigan, the
the Mayaguez
Mayaguez InciIncident is limited
four short
paragraphs entitled,
entitled, "The
"The Mayaguez
dent
limited to four
short paragraphs
"The
Mayaguez Crisis,"
Crisis," "The
Capture," "A
Swift Reaction,"
Capture.t'
vA Swift
Reaction," and
and "They're
"They're All Safe."
Safe." Part of
it reads:
ofit
reads:
Ford exerted
exerted diplomatic
pressure to no
no avail.
avail. Eventually
Ford
diplomatic pressure
Eventually the President
President
ordered air strikes
against Cambodian
Cambodian targets
ordered
strikes against
targets and
and a Marine
Marine assault
assault to
to
rescue the
the Mayaguez
Mayaguez crew.
crew. The
The success
rescue
success of
of the
the operation
operation earned
earned Ford
Ford
praise at the
the same
same time
boosted the
praise
time it boosted
post-Vietnam
morale
the post-Vietnam
morale of
of
America's military.
America's
military.
Not only
only is the
the word
word "rescue"
Not
"rescue" used
mention
used rather
rather than
than "release,"
" release," but
but there
there is no
no mention
of
US casualties
casualties at all. Thus
Thus does
does a debacle
debacle appear
appear like a triumph.
of us
triumph .
In striking
striking contrast
contrast with
with Ford's
Ford's handling
handling of
of Mayaguez,
Mayaguez, a key part
of the
part of
explanation
negative perceptions
of Somalia
lies with
explanation for negative
perceptions of
Somalia lies
with the
the Clinton
Clinton administraadministration. Throughout
focused on domestic
domestic issues,
tion.
Throughout 1993,
1993, Clinton
Clinton focused
issues, and
and avoided
avoided risking
risking
political capital
capital to build
build a public
public consensus
consensus for
political
for the
the Somalia
Somalia policy
policy (Foyle
(Foyle 1999:
219). The
The inherent
inherent risks
of the
the operation
operation were
discussed; neither
219).
risks of
were rarely
rarely discussed;
neither were
were the
the
stakes, or what
what could
could not
not be achieved
achieved (Woods
(Woods 1997:
stakes,
could and could
1997: 165, 167). The
The
upshot of
was that
that "support
popular undertaking
upshot
of all this was
"support for an initially
initially popular
undertaking collapsed
collapsed
amid
confusion about
American purposes.
purposes. Was
amid confusion
about American
Was this
this a humanitarian
humanitarian mission.
mission, a
manhunt for a wily
wily warlord,
warlord, or
or a nation-building
nation-building program?"
program?" (Crocker
manhunt
(Crocker 1995: 7).
Furthennore, the
the way
way that
that the
the administration
administration reacted
reacted to
Furthermore,
to events
events in Mogadishu
Mogadishu
framed the
the whole
whole intervention
intervention as a disaster.
disaster. Although
Although Clinton
framed
emerClinton did
did send
send emergency troops
troops to protect
protect those
those already
already there,
the overall
gency
there, the
overall administration
demeanor
administration demeanor
was one
one of
of embattlement,
embarrassment, and defeat.
defeat. A
was
ernbattlement, embarrassment.
A few
few days
days after
after
Mogadishu, when
when Secretary
Secretary of
of Defense
Defense Lee Aspin
Mogadishu,
of State
State
Aspin and Secretary
Secretary of
Warren Christopher
Christopher met
met with
with over
over 200
200 members
members of
of Congress,
Warren
Congress, the Congressmen
Congressmen
expected to
to hear
hear a plan
from Aspin
Aspin and
and Christopher
expected
plan from
Christopher showing
that the administraadministrashowing that
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tion was in control.
control. The administration,
administration, however,
however, wanted
wanted to hear Congressional
Congressional
views, and offered
offered little leadership
leadership on the issue. The meeting
meeting was a disaster
disaster and
led to increased
increased calls
calls for a pullout
pullout (Foyle
(Foyle 1999:
1999: 221
221).).
decision to pull out effectively
effectively doomed
doomed the entire
entire Somalia
Somalia mission
mission to the
The decision
category of
category
of failure. The evidence
evidence suggests
suggests that,
that, despite
despite the waning
waning popularity
popularity of
the Somalia
Somalia venture
venture by October
October 1993, Clinton
Clinton did have other
other options
options available.
available.
The president
president could
could have tried
tried to cast
cast the Mogadishu
Mogadishu battle
battle as one of
of heroism
heroism
opponent, and called
called for the redoubling
redoubling of
of efforts
efforts to capture
capture
against a brutal opponent,
Aidid, in order
Clinton
Aidid,
order to win-first-and-then-leave.
win-first-and-then-leave,
Clinton might
might have mobilized
mobilized
support
support for punishing
punishing Aidid
Aidid by tapping
tapping into
into the American
American desire
desire for retaliation
retaliation
(Feaver and Gelpi 2004: 134; Kull et al.
al. 1997; Burk 1999; Kull and Destler
Destler
(Feaver
1999). Immediately
Immediately after
after the October
October raid, 51
51 percent
percent of
of Americans
Americans wanted
wanted to
continue
continue to try to capture
capture Aidid, and later polls
polls showed
showed up to 71
7\ percent
percent support
support
for such action - so long as these
these efforts
efforts would
would not significantly
significantly delay
delay the withNews poll,
poll, October
drawal (ABC News
October 5, 1993; Feaver
Feaver and Gelpi
Gelpi 2004: 134; Burk
1999; Kull and Destler
Destler 1999; Larson
Larson 1996: 70). In
In one poll, 46 percent
percent of
of Amerconsidered the demands
demands of
of congressmen
congressmen for an immediate
immediate pullout
pullout to be an
icans considered
overreaction
overreaction to the events
events in Mogadishu.
Mogadishu."22 If the mission
mission had ended
ended with Aidid
behind bars, the perception
perception of
of the overall
overall operation
operation would
would probably
probably have been
behind
dramatically
dramatically different.
different.

Conclusions
Conclusions
Americans are to judge
judge either
If Americans
either Mayaguez
Mayaguez or Somalia
Somalia as a success,
success, why would
give the laurels
they choose
choose to give
laurels to the Mayaguez
Mayaguez debacle,
debacle, rather
rather than
than to the
humanitarian mission
humanitarian
mission in Somalia
Somalia that saved
saved the lives of
of tens or hundreds
hundreds of
thousands of
of people?
people? In
In certain
certain respects,
respects, the outcome
outcome was similar:
similar: 41 versus
versus 43
thousands
US deaths,
deaths, with fierce
fierce battles
battles in both cases
cases in hostile
hostile territory.
territory. But when one
considers
considers the gains
gains and losses
losses resulting
resulting from
from the overall
overall intervention,
intervention, material
material
benefits
more evident
evident in Somalia.
Somalia. So, the puzzle
puzzle is why perceptions
perceptions of
benefits were far more
victory in both cases
cases were diametrically
diametrically opposed
opposed to the results
results on the ground.
ground.
The answer
answer to this puzzle
puzzle is that in neither
neither case
case did Americans
Americans judge
judge victory
victory by
score-keeping the outcome.
score-keeping
outcome. Instead,
Instead, match-fixing
match-fixing ensured
ensured that American
American
observers
predisposed to see the United
observers were predisposed
United States
States as the winner
winner in 1975 and
1994.
the loser in 19921992-1994.
American evaluations
American
evaluations of
of the Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident
Incident diverged
diverged from the material
material
scorecard in a positive
direction. . Perceptions
Perceptions of
of success
success were shaped
shaped by mindpositive direction
scorecard
experience of
of Vietnam
Vietnam and Nixon
Nixon set the bar low for victory,
victory, and
sets (the recent experience
Americans
Americans tend to favor decisive
decisive action
action to rescue
rescue hostages),
hostages), salient
salient events
events (an
immediate military
military response
response hidden
hidden from direct
direct media
media view gave
gave an impression
impression
immediate
of
of a decisive
decisive President,
President, resolute
resolute and in control),
control), and social
social pressures
pressures (the
(the administration
istration spun the mission
mission to Ford's
Ford's advantage,
advantage, and the media
media largely
largely toed
the line).
American evaluations
evaluations of
of the Somalia
Somalia intervention,
intervention, by contrast,
contrast, diverged
diverged from
American
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the material
material scorecard
direction. Perceptions
were again
again
scorecard in a negative
negative direction.
Perceptions of
of failure
failure were
shaped
time the
the
shaped by
by mindsets
mindsets (this
(this time
the great
great expectations
expectations arising
arising from
from the
the end
end of
of the
Cold War
War and
and the
the Gulf
Gulf War,
War, and
and hostility
toward nation-building),
nation-building),
salient events
events
Cold
hostility toward
salient
(the striking
striking images
images of
of the
the Mogadishu
battle), and
social pressures
(media report(the
Mogadishu battle),
and social
pressures (media
reportand the
the administration's
administration's
failure to explain
explain and
and build
build a consensus
consensus around
around
ing and
failure
revised goals
goals in Somalia).
Somalia). Table
Table 3.3
3.3 summarizes
summarizes the
the key
key factors
factors that
that led
led to mirrormirrorrevised
image match-fixing
the Somalia
image
match-fixing of
of the
the Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident
Incident and
and the
Somalia intervention
intervention. .
Perceptions
of both
both events
events may
served to lead
lead subsequent
subsequent U.S.
U.S. foreign
foreign
Perceptions of
may have
have served
policy
the Mayaguez
Mayaguez Incident
policy astray.
astray. After
After 1975, falsely
falsely positive
positive perceptions
perceptions of
of the
Incident
may
have encouraged
encouraged President
President Jimmy
Carter to
to go
go ahead
ahead with
Iranian
may have
Jimmy Carter
with the
the risky
risky Iranian
hostage rescue
rescue attempt
attempt in 1980.
1980. This
This led
led to another
another military
military and
and diplomatic
diplomatic
hostage
debacle. But
But unlike
unlike Mayaguez,
Mayaguez, this
recognized the
rescue mission
debacle.
this time
time Americans
Americans recognized
the rescue
mission
failure, and
and as a result,
result, Carter
Carter lost
lost the
the election
election (Hemmer
(Hemmer 2000).
as a failure,
After
falsely negative
negative perceptions
perceptions of
of Somalia
disastrous lessons
lessons
After 1993, falsely
Somalia created
created disastrous
the future
future of
of humanitarian
humanitarian
missions. For
For most
observers, Somalia
Somalia demonstrademonstrafor the
missions.
most observers,
the intractable
intractable difficulties
difficulties of
of nation-building,
nation-building,
and the
the inherent
inherent problems
ted the
and
problems in
fielding multinational
multinational
forces such
UNOSOM 11.
II. And,
And, of
of course,
course, there
there is some
some
fielding
forces
such as UNOSOM
truth in these
these lessons.
lessons. But
But at the
the same
same time,
time, the
the Somalia
Somalia intervention
intervention
demontruth
demonstrates the
the potential
for hugely
hugely successful
successful humanitarian
humanitarian
relief operations,
operations, where
where
strates
potential for
relief
national force
force with
with considerable
considerable
resources leads
leads a swift
swift and
a determined
determ ined national
resources
and decidecisive intervention.
intervention.
As John
John Hirsch
Hirsch and
and Robert
Oakley argue,
argue, the
the United
United States
States
sive
As
Robert Oakley
"achieved an important
important humanitarian
humanitarian
objective, showed
showed that
coordination
of critcrit"achieved
objective,
that coordination
of
ical elements
elements can
can be achieved,
produced a positive
161).
ical
achieved, and
and produced
positive result"
result" ((1995:
1995: 161
).
But
not the
the lessons
most people
people drew
drew from
from the
the episode.
episode. The
The belief
But these
these were
were not
lessons most
belief
that
the United
United States
States had
had suffered
suffered a defeat
defeat in Somalia
Somalia would
would have
have enormous
enormous
that the
consequences
for the
the fate
of hundreds
of thousands
thousands of
of people
people in another
another African
consequences
for
fate of
hundreds of
African
country
with
shed to
to avoid
country synonymous
synonymous
with tragedy:
tragedy: Rwanda.
Rwanda. Partly
Partly because
because it wi
wished
avoid
another "defeat"
"defeat" like
like Somalia,
Somalia, the
the United
United States
States decided
decided to do
do almost
almost nothing
another
nothing in
Rwanda,
have saved
many thousands
Rwanda, when
when a military
military intervention
intervention could
could have
saved many
thousands of
of lives
lives
(DiPrizio
2002: 71, 148-149).
148-149). The
The tragedy
tragedy is that
that had
had US
US leaders
leaders and
and the
the AmerAmer(Di
Prizio 2002:
ican public
public perceived
Somalia as being
being at least
least a partial
partial success,
success, the
the Clinton
Clinton
ican
perceived Somalia
administration
might have
offered a more
policy against
against genocide
administration
might
have offered
more robust
robust policy
genocide in
Rwanda. Most
people in Rwanda
Rwanda were
were probably
probably unaware
of the
the course
of the
the
Rwanda.
Most people
unaware of
course of
US
mission in Somalia,
Somalia, but
but American
American perceptions
perceptions of
of that
that event
event would
would detem1ine
determine
US mission
whether many
these Rwandans
would live
whethcr
many of
of these
Rwandans would
live or
or die.
die.

Notes
Noles
For further
further evidence,
evidence, see Kull and Clark
(2001).). Richard
Richard Eichenberg
(2004) found
Clark (2001
Eichenberg (2004)
support for interventions
interventions always
always rises
rises if the
rhc mission
success, regardregardthat public
public support
mission is a success,
of casualties
casualties or thc
rypc of
of operation.
operation. For evidence
evidence that women
women are more
more sensisensiless of
the type
failure than men,
Eichenberg (2003
tive to success
success and failure
men, sec Eichenberg
(2003:: 135).
2 On May 16, the New
New York Times headline
"Copters Evacuate
Evacuate U.S. Marines
Marines and
headline read, "Copters
Ship-Rescue Mission
Mission Ends; Toll Includes
Includes One
One Known
Known Dead.
Dead."" The Wall Street
Street
Ship-Rescue

71
71

D.
AND
D. JOHNSON
JOHNSON
AND
D.. TIERNEY
TIERNEY
D

Journal headline
headline on the same
same day read,
JOt/mal
"Success of
of Mayaguez
Mayaguez Recovery
Recovery Bol
Bolsters
read, "Success
sters
Ford
Political Stock,
Stock, Military
Military Morale."
Ford's' s Political
Morale."
3 Letter,
Letter, Max Friedersdorf
Friedersdorf to President
President Ford, May 16, 1975, folder
folder ""Mayaguez
SituMayaguez Situation - General
General (2),"
ation
(2)," Box 25, Philip
Philip W. Buchen
Buchen Files,
Files, Gerald
Library; Press
Press
Gerald R. Ford Library;
Statement
Congressman Carroll
Statement from Congressman
Carroll Hubbard,
Hubbard, May
[5, 1975,
1975, folder
"Mayaguez May 15,
folder "Mayaguez
General," Box 14, Ron Nessen
Nessen Papers
Gerald R. Ford Library.
General,"
Papers 1974-1977,
1974-1977, Gerald
Library.
There was some
some variation
perceptions of
4 There
variation in perceptions
of success.
success. For example,
example, men
men,, blacks,
blacks. and
Democrats were
were somewhat
more favorable
Democrats
somewhat more
favorable in their
their evaluations
evaluations of
of Somalia,
Somalia, and
and
women, whites,
whites, and Republicans
were somewhat
women,
Republicans were
somewhat less favorable
favorable (Eichenberg
(Eichenberg 2003:
2003:
135; CBS/New
CBS/New York Times poll,
poll, June
June 21-24,
21-24, 1993
1993;; CBS/New
CBS/New York Times poll
poll,, June
June
21-24, 1993; Newsweek
Newsweek poll,
poll, June
I; ABC
ABC News/
21-24,
June 30-July
3O-July I;
News/Washington
Post poll.
poll.
Washington Post
November 11-14,
November
11-14, 1993).
5 There
number of
of complexities
There are a number
complexities regarding
subjective versus
objective aspects,
aspects.
regarding subjective
versus objective
relative versus
versus absolute
absolute gains,
relative
gains, and
and so on, which
which are treated
treated in much more
more detail
detail in
Failing 10
to Win (Johnson
Tierney 2006).
Failing
(Johnson and Tierney
2006), Omitting
Omitting the details
doess not affect
affect the
details doe
argument here. The
that Framework
Framework I, "score-keeping,"
argument
The key point
point is that
"score-keeping," offers
offers a reasonreasonably
analysis of
who won on the ground.
ably fair analysis
of who
ground.
6 We do not consider
consider Cambodian
and losses,
Cambodian gains
gains and
losses, because
because the mission
mission was designed
designed
resc ue the crew
crew at minimal
to rescue
minimal cost,
cost, and Cambodian
Cambodian losses
losses were
were largely
largely incidenta
incidental.l.
These losses
losses included
included a Khmer
base and oil storage
These
Khmer base
storage facility,
facility, eight
eight to ten patrol
patrol boats.
boats.
around 100
I 00 troops
troops killed
killed or injured
and around
injured (Huchthausen
(Huchthausen 2003:
2003: 15).
7 The
The three
three Marines
Marines left behind
behind were
were Lance
Lance Corporal
Corporal Joseph
Private First
First
Joseph Hargrove,
Hargrove, Private
Class Gary
Gary Hall,
Hall, and Private
Class
Private Danny
Danny Marshall.
Marshall. Regarding
Regarding the faulty intelligence
intelligence, ,
"There was no evidence
evidence at all, except
"There
except the fact that the Mayaguez
anchored
Mayaguez was still anchored
off
Koh Tang,
Tang, to suggest
was being
off Koh
suggest that the crew
crew was
being detained
detained on Koh Tang
Tang island
island. ....
The assa
ult on
on Koh Tang
The
assault
Tang was an assault
assault on the wrong
wrong island,
island, and it was an assa
assault
ult
entirely without
without a military
entirely
military point"
point" (Gabriel
(Gabriel 1985: 73). The
likely resistance
resistance should
should
The likely
also
have been
been clear
clear many
also have
many hours
hours beforehand:
beforehand: "What
"What was certain
certain was that the island
island
well defended.
defended. Every
was well
Every time
time a plane
plane made
made a low pass,
streams of
of tracers
tracers arced
arced up
pass, streams
island in pursuit"
from the island
pursuit" (Wetterhahn
(Wenerhahn 2002:
2002: 78).
review these
these biases
Johnson and Tierney
8 We review
biases in detail
detail in Johnson
Tierney (2006).
(2006).
9 Two
Two days
days after
after the raid, 59 percent
Americans had seen
seen the
the pictures;
percent of
of Americans
pictures; by midmidOctober, 84 percent
percent had seen them
October,
them (CNN/USA
(CNN/USA Today
Today poll,
poll, October
October 5, 1993
1993;; Nationa
National l
Research Inc. poll
October 15-18,
1993; Sharkey
Research
poll,, October
15-18,1993;
Sharkey 1993:
1993: 14-19).
14-19).
IO Conversation
Conversation in Oval Office
Office (recorded
Brent Scowcroft),
10
(recorded by Brent
Scowcroft), Ford,
Ford, Kissinger,
Kissinger, ScowScowcroft present,
May 14, 1975 - Ford,
ssinger," Box III,I,
croft
present, May 14, 1973, folder
folder ""May
Ford, Ki
Kissinger,"
National Security
Security Adviser:
Adviser: Memoranda
1977, Gerald
National
Memoranda of
of Conversations
Conversations 19731973-1977,
Gerald R. Ford
Ford
Library.
Library.
11 Kissinger
referring to the air strikes
11
Kissinger was referring
strikes on the mainland
mainland and a confusion
confusion which
which
arose over
military orders
arose
over military
orders. . Conversation
Conversation in Oval
Oval Office
Office 09:25-10:38
09:25-10:38 (recorded
(recorded by
Brent Scowcroft),
present, May 14, 1975, folder
Brent
Scowcroft), Ford, Kissinger,
Kissinger, Scowcroft
Scowcroft present,
folder ""May
May
16, 1975 - Ford,
Ford, Kissinger,"
Ki ssinger," Box 11,
National Security
II, National
Security Adviser:
Adviser: Memoranda
Memoranda of
of ConConversations 1973-1977,
Gerald R. Ford
Ford Library.
Library .
versations
1973-1977, Gerald
12 News
News conference
conference transcript,
4:30 p.rn.,
p.m ., folder
transcript, May 12, 1975,
1975,4:30
folder ""Mayaguez
Situation- Mayaguez Situation
Nessen Press
Press Briefings:'
Briefings," Box 25, Philip
Files, Gerald
Nessen
Philip W. Buchen
Buchen Files.
Gerald R. Ford Library
Library
(see also
also Menetrey-Monchau
Menetrey-Monchau 2005: 339).
(see
339).
13 Transcript
Transcript of
of meeting,
meeting, May 13
NSC Meeting
Meeting 5/13/75
13
13,, 1975, folder
folder ""NSC
5/13/75 (evening),"
(evening)." Box
Box
National Security
Security Adviser:
Co uncil Meetings
I, National
Adviser: National
National Security
Security Council
Meetings File,
File. Gerald
Gerald R.
Library, p. 20.
Ford Library,
20.
14 News
News conference
conference transcript,
transcript, May 15, 1975, 11
.m., folder
Mayaguez Situation
II :50a
:50a.m.,
folder ""Mayaguez
Situation Nessen Press
Press Briefings,"
Briefings," Box 25, Philip
Philip W. Buchen
Files. Gerald
Nessen
Buchen Files,
Gerald R.
R. Ford Library.
Library.
The Cambodian
Holt approaching.
Cambodian broadcast
broadcast specifically
specifically referred
referred to the USS Hoi!
approaching.
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15
15 Statement
Statement by
by Secretary
Secretary of
3:30a.m. EDT,
of Defense
Defense Schlesinger,
Schlesinger, 3:30a.m.
EDT, May 15, 1975, folder
folder
"Cambodia
Mayaguez Seizure
"Cambodia - Mayaguez
Seizure (2),"
(2)," Box
Box 1,
I, National
National Security
Security Adviser:
Adviser:
Kissinger-Scowcroft West
Wing Office
Office Files
Kissinger-Scowcroft
West Wing
Gerald R. Ford
Files 1969-1977,
1969-1977, Gerald
Ford Library.
Library.
16
transcript, May 15, 1975, 11:50a.m.,
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